The inquiry into the Iraq war will not produce a final report until 2011, well beyond the general election and almost a decade after the first planning for the 2003 invasion began, its chairman Sir John Chilcot said yesterday.

The inquiry into the Iraq war will not produce a final report until 2011, well beyond the general election and almost a decade after the first planning for the 2003 invasion began, its chairman Sir John Chilcot said yesterday.

Launching the long-awaited inquiry, Sir John confirmed that Tony Blair, the former prime minister who sent British troops into the conflict alongside the US forces, would definitely be expected to give evidence in public and that most witnesses would be questioned in public.

A commitment to hold the majority of hearings in public, contrary to Gordon Brown's initial prospectus for the official inquiry, was one of the few definitive points that Sir John made in a broad-sweeping outline of the remit and aims of his inquiry team.

Mr Brown's original announcement that the inquiry would be held in private and conducted along the lines of the Franks Inquiry into the Falklands war was met with scorn and derision by a string of senior political and military figures and forced a U-turn which was facilitated by Sir John's own announcement that he preferred to take as much evidence as possible in public.

The government also abandoned Mr Brown's initial insistence that the inquiry could not apportion blame.

Yesterday Sir John pledged he was committed to the principles of "objectivity, impartiality, serving governments of whatever complexion, and serving also the truth" and that he would not hesitate to criticise the key players in the war if they had been at fault.

"If we find going through the evidence that people fell short in their duty, made mistakes, acted wrongly we will say so and say so clearly," he said.

Sir John told a press conference in London that he and his four colleagues, all privy counsellors, would find it impossible to complete a report on the entire scope of the Iraq invasion, from 2001 to the present day, within a year.

He said he was "determined to avoid a long, drawn-out inquiry" but late in 2010 was "probably the earliest possible" date that a report would be published - though he warned it could take longer.

"It is a huge job," Sir John said. "If we are to do it properly, we have to have the time to enable us to do that."

He also insisted that the inquiry would be held largely in public and that members of the inquiry would travel to Iraq to take evidence and hold "discussions" with overseas allies and their governments.

Opposition parties yesterday renewed their calls for a full, open inquiry and Sir John - a retired senior civil servant who sat on the closed doors Butler inquiry into the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction used to justify the Iraq war - repeated his insistence that, "wherever possible", evidence would be heard in public, perhaps on live television or by streaming internet.

One of his first actions would be to contact the families of military personnel who died in the conflict to determine what their priorities were for the inquiry.

Some sessions would be taken in private, "consistent with the need to protect national security" and to ensure "candour and openness" from witnesses.

Military and specialist legal advisers will help the panel but will not interrogate witnesses, which, the opposition claim is another weakness. Senior LibDem Sir Menzies Campbell said the panel should have included a senior military and political figure and should have appointed a QC to conduct cross examinations.

Asked whether Mr Brown would be asked to give evidence, Sir John said he was "not proposing today to offer a list of witnesses" but reiterated his committee's desire to question the "key decision-makers in the different phases of the Iraq affair".

He did not expect witnesses to refuse to appear or to give anything but "truthful, fair and accurate" accounts of themselves, although there will be no evidence under oath.

"If someone were foolish or wicked enough to tell an untruth, a serious untruth, in front of an inquiry like this, and then be found out, their reputation would be destroyed utterly. It won't happen," he said.

Shadow foreign secretary William Hague said he was pleased some sessions would be held in public and the inquiry could "apportion blame" but was concerned about the wriggle room Sir Jonh apparently gave to Ministers to give their evidence in private for the sake of "candour". The SNP's Angus Robertson also said Mr Brown and Mr Blair must give evidence in public.

All government documents, including crucial cabinet papers on the legal basis for war, will be available to the committee and Sir John hoped for co-operation from the US government. "The Anglo-American relationship is one of the most central parts of this inquiry, and how that was conducted is something that we need to get a very strong understanding of."

There have been two inquiries - Butler and Hutton - and two Commons committee reports into Iraq already.

The Chilcot process which will address once and for all the nagging doubts about the basis for the war, its legality, and when exactly the then prime minister decided to go to war.

Sir John said: "We are determined to be thorough, rigorous, fair and frank to enable us to form impartial and evidence-based judgments on all aspects of the issues, including the argument about the legality of the conflict."

He dismissed suggestions that his report would be seen as a "whitewash". "The proof of this exercise will be in the report and in the quality, the independence and the thoroughness of the evidence and the judgements and conclusions we reach".

The witness

  • Tony Blair: The star witness. Ultimately responsible for sending British troops to Iraq, has often justified the decision but still faces accusations that he acted against international law. Did he do anything illegal?
  • Gordon Brown: The man who was not there. Sat in cabinet for all the crucial decisions but made very few public utterances during the conflict. Brought troops home in 2008, but will be haunted to the polls by the inquiry. How involved was he?
  • Alastair Campbell: The message man. One of the key communications advisers blamed for the so-called dodgy dossier' of evidence on Saddam's weapons , an episode which ended in the death of British weapons expert Dr David Kelly. Did he bend the rules?
  • Sir John Scarlett: The spook. Chairman of the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), where he was responsible for the controversial government dossier on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Went on to become "C", the head of MI6. Did he use selective intelligence?
  • Lord Goldsmith: The legal justification. The then-Attorney General set out in nine short paragraphs his reasoning that even without the "second resolution" which UK diplomats had been frantically trying to secure, existing UN resolutions permitted an invasion. Was he lent on?
  • Admiral Lord Boyce: Chief of Defence Staff. The man in charge of the military invasio, who demanded a legal cover note for his troops before the invasion went ahead. Did he have confidence in the operation?
  • Claire Short: The wringing hands. Has already revealed much of what she knew about the pre-invasion Cabinet but has never explained why she resigned after the war began and not before. Why did she wait before resigning?