In defence of optimism

Both reports are welcome and necessary. We need a greater dialogue on Scotland's security future and while the Scottish Government should be leading this dialogue, as things stand, it is not.

However, while these two reports differ in focus, they do share one thing: a pejorative vision of how a newly independent Scotland would fare in provisioning and aligning itself in security terms; this vision based upon a hugely negative depiction of UK-Scottish relations after a Yes vote.

Both reports make significant play of how an independent Scotland won't be able to recreate what the UK currently has and does. This is almost exclusively depicted as a negative.

Size-wise, an independent Scotland will clearly be a smaller state than the remainder of the UK (rUK). Its defence budget and military footprint will reduce accordingly. As to the perceived negativity of this diminution, defence and security boffins often have a very narrow view of what is "good" and "bad". The Iraq war has cost the UK around £8.3 billion; this figure omits the vast financial and societal costs associated with post-conflict medical treatment and the various damages suffered by service personnel and those around them.

Adopting a "manageable but meaningful" military posture will allow Scotland to avoid many of the other huge costs that arise from Downing Street's bold military aspirations. Having military bases abroad, for example, might "prove" the UK's global credentials but it is an unaffordable commitment that the UK is being forced to address. Withdrawing UK forces from their German bases will cost around £1.8bn. When looked at in those terms, recreating the "UK model" might not seem that appealing. What would a "Scottish military model" look like? In considering this question, the Henry Jackson Foundation's report does not fancy Scotland's chances of provisioning itself through its share of inherited UK military assets. It contends that a newly independent Scotland will "have a difficult time" in securing some key military pieces for itself in secession negotiations with London. It asserts, for example, that since the UK currently possesses just four River-class offshore patrol vessels, Scottish negotiators will likely have to procure such vessels "elsewhere". In other words, if London decides that Scotland shouldn't get one of those vessels, then that's that.

This viewpoint betrays the authors' curiously pessimistic view of where Scotland will stand in its post-referendum negotiations. Not as an equal and friendly partner, not as a state with innumerable assets which rUK would want access to, but as a junior partner which will be "given" equipment only if it suits London to give it.

In the hugely unlikely event that secession negotiations did indeed take on such an adversarial, punitive hue – and there is absolutely no reason to think that this would happen – it is fanciful to suggest that it would be rUK which would be holding all of the bartering cards.

Both reports also invoke the notion that a newly independent Scotland will be frozen out of intelligence activities by rUK. Aside from invoking (once more) the wildly improbable vision of a cold, unco-operative post-referendum rUK Government, this view assumes that rUK – surely, among the most intelligence-focused states in the world – would be happy to turn a cold shoulder to its northern neighbour and, in doing so, "leave the back door open".

Both reports remind readers that state governments pass on intelligence only if it is in their interests to do so. Are we to take seriously the implication that Scottish and rUK interests would suddenly somehow diverge if Scotland were to become independent?

Nobody is suggesting that London would automatically "throw open the intelligence books" to a newly independent Scotland. However, it seems incredible to think that rUK would allow a Scotland-sized gap to open up in its backyard, allowing possible threats from Islamic terrorism, fragments of Irish dissident activity, and drug smuggling to fester just across its northern border. With these activities always threatening and with Trident likely to be based in Scotland until perhaps 2024, can the report authors truly not envisage reasons as to why UK-Scottish intelligence co-operation would in fact be overwhelmingly likely?

I hope that the "battle of the reports" will continue in the months ahead. The two most recent documents have done a fine job of examining key issues and generating debate.

However, their combined thesis is based upon a vision of future problems and confrontation; neo-nate Scotland struggling to find its feet amidst the cold aloofness of its closest ally. Every possible negative permutation is illuminated. Well informed, rigorously researched, these reports stretch fatalism to breaking point. Will it really be thus for a newly independent Scotland?

There is absolutely nothing to suspect that a Yes vote will plunge Scotland into a messy UK divorce. Edinburgh will not enter secession negotiations making heated, unrealistic demands of the UK. London, for its part, will approach negotiations knowing that the world will be watching how it responds to Scotland's model democratic journey. It will – rightly – be firm in its own expectations and demands but will gain nothing from a punitive approach.

With so much to negotiate – Trident drawdown in Scotland, the use of key Scottish military assets such as the Cape Wrath training facility, UK debt apportionment, Scotland's willingness to assume (and pay for) key roles such as aerial maritime surveillance and reconnaissance around the British Isles, and many other issues – the likelihood is that the two sides will make reluctant concessions but will arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement.

Cue a bold new future for two states that will be best served by continuing to work in close alignment with each other.

Dr John MacDonald is a Scottish university lecturer, political commentator and security analyst.