It is not difficult to understand the sudden clamour for extending the bombing of Daesh targets in the Middle East.

Following the murder of 30 British tourists by a lone gunman on a Tunisian beach and the associated atrocities in Kuwait and France there was always going to be a cry for something to be done to punish Daesh. Even prime minister David Cameron was moved to argue that it represents an "existential threat" and that consideration has to be given to the possibility of attacking strategic targets in Syria where Daesh has built up a weighty presence.

So serious was Cameron's concern that the subject was debated last week in the House of Commons and it is probably only a matter of time before the government changes its policy on bombing Syria - two years after it shied away from doing the same thing to punish President Bashar al-Assad for allegedly developing and using chemical weapons against his own people.

The argument this time seems to be that if the terrorist attacks were planned in the Syrian city of Raqqa, now de facto capital of Daesh, then should that not be a prime military target for coalition strike aircraft?

After all, if Daesh can operate at will across northern Iraq and eastern Syria there is no reason why RAF aircrew should not also enjoy the same freedom of movement.

From a purely military point of view the case put forward by defence secretary Michael Fallon is not without merit. During the past year Daesh forces have expanded their territorial holdings across the area and have paid no attention to the border crossings between Iraq and Syria which they hold in any case.

If targets are to be attacked in one country then it makes no sense at all to ignore them in the other if the priority is to degrade enemy military capacity and prevent Daesh from continuing its policy of expansion and repression.

But in that eventuality there is more to this kind of warfare than simply engaging enemy combatants and killing them. By its very nature air power is always a blunt instrument.

Strike aircraft can destroy targets and make life extremely difficult for the opposition on the ground but they cannot gain and hold territory; that is the job of infantry.

So, if the intention is to defeat Daesh once and for all, or at the very least destroy its ability to act, then "boots on the ground" will have to be deployed and damn the consequences.

However, after the recent misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan no western leader would dare advocate such a policy, fearing the unintended consequences which all too often follow such hasty and emotionally motivated decisions.

Besides it has to be asked what would be gained by any extension of bombing in this region. The UK has no strategic imperatives in Syria and while there is much to be said for standing up to the barbaric policies of Daesh and doing something about its allure for young Muslims who are motivated by its dreams of creating a global caliphate, bombing it into submission does not seem to be the answer.

As Crispin Blunt the chair of the foreign affairs select committee said last week the presence of half a dozen elderly RAF Tornado bombers has achieved very little to date and will not accomplish much more in the future even if their target list is doubled to include Daesh positions in Syria.

If this sounds like a policy of despair which points to Daesh holding all the aces, leaving the west impotent, then there has to be more to resolving this issue than resorting to further violence.

For a start more could be done to involve the regional partners who surely have a greater stake in dealing with the issue than the rest of the world has. Yet nothing has been done to engage Iran which also has much to lose if Daesh continues with the hostile brand of Sunni expansionism which has thrown the Middle East into turmoil.

There are reasons for this absence notably the longstanding fears posed by Iran's expansion of its nuclear capabilities and its own commitment to protecting Shia interests in the Middle East but Tehran remains an important player in the region not least because it can actually provide troops on the ground.

Turkey too could have role to play. It is a member of Nato but this is balanced by the alarm it feels at the role being played by Kurdish forces in the conflict and the need to protect its own interests in the face of growing Kurdish nationalism.

Whatever else, though, it does have certain responsibilities to maintain the integrity of its border with Syria which is used as the main conduit for supplying Daesh with arms and providing it with reinforcements. Jordan shares that responsibility but while it has been contributing to the air campaign it has other problems to confront on the humanitarian aid front.

This leaves Saudi Arabia but it has other fish to fry in the ongoing air campaign in Yemen where it leads an Arab coalition confronting the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in their struggle to retain a hold on government.

None of this is happening in isolation. While France, the UK and the US have made much of the impact that the emergence of Daesh has had on their internal affairs - it is now the world's biggest terrorist organisation - little thought has been given to Russia which is also a player, being an ally of both Syria and Iran.

In that role it too should have concerns about the spread of Sunni expansionism yet largely as a result of its problems with Ukraine its voice has been ignored.

This cannot make sense at a time when an increasingly isolationist US has confined its policies to confronting Daesh in Iraq. With Moscow's proven links to Syria this could be the time to stop talking about bombs and start talking about another kind of approach.