How will we cope with the battle of Britain to come?

Katie Schmuecker: The election result raises for the first time the prospect of different parties in power in Holyrood and Westminster, a scenario that has been met with predictions of titanic clashes between Gordon Brown and Alex Salmond.

KATIE SCHMUECKER

Whatever the outcome of the current negotiations, Alex Salmond is likely to be the next First Minister of Scotland, either as leader of a coalition or of a minority government. This raises for the first time the prospect of different parties in power in Holyrood and Westminster, a scenario that has been met with predictions of titanic clashes between Gordon Brown and Alex Salmond. What has been overlooked in this debate is the rather less glamorous, but nonetheless important, question of how our system of government will cope with this new development. The straightforward answer is likely to be: not very well.

Labour in London has shown considerable indifference to devolution since successfully establishing the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. The central structure of Whitehall barely changed to adapt to devolution, and little thought was given to its role in conflict resolution and co-ordinating policy differences across the UK. While it was famously said that devolution is a process, not an event, viewed in this way it could be said that, in London, devolution was emphatically an event, and not a process. Undoubtedly, devolution should be seen as a key part of Blair's political legacy, but the truth is that he didn't finish the job.

This indifference from central government has not mattered until now, as devolution operated under benign circumstances. From 1999 until last week, Labour was in power or leading a coalition in all parts of Britain. This enabled disputes, negotiations and disagreements to be handled informally and behind closed doors. Internal Labour Party discussions, alongside Blair's famous sofa-style approach to government, ensured that even difficult and angry disputes - for instance, over the introduction of long-term care - were smoothed over.

An SNP-led executive, however, is more likely to challenge the authority of Westminster, pushing for greater powers and resources, disputing competencies and being far more vociferous when it does not get its way. We can expect to hear it wanting to lead on European negotiations rather than deferring to the UK, especially in relation to the Common Fisheries Policy. Control of oil and gas revenue will also be a likely point of tension. Even if there is a minority government, the SNP will find support from both the Greens and Liberal Democrats in challenging Westminster on policies such as the building of more nuclear power stations in Scotland. All this will be fiercely resisted by a new Brown administration.

Such robust exchange is the stuff of politics in other devolved or federated countries. The problem is that in the UK we do not have the robust institutions needed to deal with it. Relations between Edinburgh and London are governed by joint ministerial committees that rarely meet, concordats that have not been tested, personal relationships between officials and part-time territorial Secretaries of State. These measures are unlikely to be able to manage effectively divergent policy directions and conflict between different parts of the UK. It is entirely possible that we will see increasing recourse to the courts in order to settle disputes over who has the competency to act in different policy areas.

So, what can be done? It is clear that a part-time Secretary of State for Scotland will not suffice. Instead,, we need a central government Department for the Nations, Local Government and Communities with a full-time, cabinet-level Secretary of State equipped to deal with co-ordination and conflict. Such a department should focus not just on the relationship between Edinburgh and London, but should be Union-wide. The remit would not be simply about managing conflict, it would also be charged with looking at what policies are working in different parts of the UK, and what the nations can learn from each other. The opportunity for such policy learning is one of the great benefits of devolution.

Talk of an apocalyptic future of conflict between London and Edinburgh can be overdone. While, on the one hand, Alex Salmond will want to build a case for Scotland being better off out of the Union by picking fights at Westminster, on the other hand, he needs to demonstrate he can lead a competent government. As a result, he will have to be tactical in where he picks his fights.

Still, a backdrop of conflict and confrontation between Westminster and Holyrood will be a far from ideal start to Gordon Brown's premiership. One way he can ease this difficult situation is to ensure that the UK is equipped to manage the divergent approaches that will be pursued by London and Holyrood. Brown is widely tipped to start reshuffling the departmental deckchairs in Whitehall, including the possible abolition of the DTI, but the creation of a department dedicated to devolution should be a priority. A Brown-led government must embrace devolution as a process and not an event, and finish Blair's unfinished devolution business. Political conflict is inevitable in a devolved system, but Brown must ensure there are robust institutions that are fit to manage it.