What we think

There should be a time when any government know they have got it wrong: that's there's been one mistake too many; that an ambition has ceased to be achievable and has become a policy burden. For the Labour government under Gordon Brown, that limit has been reached on one key issue: identity cards. The pretence should now stop. This government are incapable of setting up, running and, crucially, keeping safe all the data that would be contained in a national identity register.

The details of 25 million people, including their names, national insurance numbers and bank account numbers, are out there somewhere on two CDs. Where? The government has no idea where. They were copied by a junior civil servant and sent through the post like copies of a shopping catalogue.

This fiasco, too far-fetched for any political drama, indicates the scale of the ineptitude. A loss of confidence in the government's ability to look after the data it already holds on all UK citizens doesn't go far enough to describe the outrage we should feel. The social contract that exists between any government and its electorate, a contract that explicitly involves keeping safe all personal information, has effectively been shredded. For some experts with inside knowledge of the way government agencies handle such data, there is little surprise. This was a debacle waiting to happen, due to the lack of competence when it comes to data protection. Asked to name one IT project where the government has got it right over the past decade, and the answer appears quickly enough: there is none.

Yet when asked if this fiasco effectively ends plans for identity cards, government ministers say no, still holding to a misplaced belief that ID cards will help make Britain safer. This is a contempt-ridden response. All politicians should be judged on their record. On anything to do with data and IT, this government has a woeful record, illustrated by the millions wasted on an NHS computer system that after years of consultancy fees still does less than a doctor with a notepad and a Biro. And the lessons learned here? There have been none. The plans for ID cards, with all the complexity of biometric data they are supposed to contain, are said to be still on course.

The issue of the trust, credibility and competence required to deliver such a project is simply ignored. The reality is that ID cards, however limited, however redesigned, will be a fiasco from day one until the day the project is finally abandoned. How can we forecast this? Listen to the statement made in the Commons last week by Alistair Darling. Imagine a similar speech a few years down the line, when not just 25 million names and bank accounts, but everyone's details from date of birth to blood type, from address to academic record, are lost as an inadequate system is breached by an amateur hacker or a criminal gang. Last week's outrage will seem small in comparison. ID cards were killed off last week. The funeral should be organised immediately.