The deal and what it means for the Middle East and the rest of the world

In one swoop the face of the Middle East was changed for ever when Iran agreed to the conditions of the US-brokered deal over the terms for developing its nuclear industry. For the Iranians it’s a time of celebration because after half a century of confrontation the relationship with the rest of the world has been put on an even keel. Sanctions are about to be lifted and as a result the lot of most Iranians will be improved and there is a chance too that Iran will cease being a no-go area as it learns again how to deal with the outside world.

For the rest of the Middle East, though, the deal represents a poison chalice with many Sunni states expressing concern that it will encourage hopes of a return to the days of the Persian Empire – until the revolution of 1979 Iran was termed Persia and inherited the mantle of an empire which once dominated most of the Arab world. One Sunni political commentator in Saudi Arabia summed up the mood when he described the outcome of the deal as “a wild beast unleashed”.

For him and many other critics the result is obvious and not at all welcome: freed from the restraints of western sanctions Iran is now able to push its tentacles across the Middle East to support its Shia clients and that can only mean trouble for the region. After years of being boxed in by the rest of the world Iran is now able to lend further and untrammelled support to its main ally Syria which is embroiled in a long-running civil war and is in the front line against the expansionist camping being waged by the Islamic State.

By the same token there will be increased support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen in their campaign to found a Shia state following the ousting earlier this year of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi who has been supported by Saudi Arabia. It also follows suit that Hezbollah in Lebanon can expect more tangible support and that will be bad news for Israel which views it not just as a terrorist group but also as a feared military opponent. It was indicative of the turmoil which followed the announcement of the deal that the first Middle Eastern leader to offer congratulations to the regime in Tehran was Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, a fellow Shia and long-term ally.

Inevitably perhaps the deal did not win universal approval in Washington where Republican hawks steeped in the years of enmity with Tehran denounced it as an “affront to the American people” and have called on President Barack Obama to do his utmost to stop tomorrow’s scheduled vote in the UN Security Council which will endorse the agreement and set the terms for its implementation. Senator Mark Kirk from Illinois spoke for many hawks in his party when he claimed that the agreement with Iran “condemns the next generation to cleaning up a nuclear war in the Persian Gulf.” He added that in his opinion it was the worst decision by a western leader since 1938 when the British prime minister Neville Chamberlain gave concessions to Adolf Hitler over the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Over-the-top accusations of that kind are to be expected from right-wing politicians in the US who have always viewed the Iranians as enemies and warmongers and who expect Tehran to use the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons but there was a different tune being played in Moscow, a long-term ally of Iran and a supporter of its ambitions to develop nuclear technology. Russia was one of the six powers which helped to broker the deal which was agreed in Vienna last week and Obama went out of his way to thank President Vladimir Putin President Putin for “Russia's important role in achieving this milestone”. Cynics might say that it suits Russia’s purpose to see the sanctions being lifted because it will increase trading opportunities – in the aftermath of the announcement the aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi announced the impending sale of its new Superjet 100 airliner to Iran – but there is more to the deal than financial gains.

Russia has been a loyal supporter of Iran’s ambitions and views the country as an important player in the Middle East and a firm bulwark against Sunni extremism. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov went one step further when he said that the deal not only redrew the strategic map but “it removes the barriers – largely artificial – on the way to a broad coalition to fight the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.” For him and for others who hope that this is a first step in the process of normalising conditions in the Middle East by bringing Iran back into the diplomatic process.

The deal and what it means for Sunni-Shia rivalries

To understand the fears created by last week’s deal it is necessary to look at the centuries old rivalry between the Sunni and Shia factions in the Islamic world. Both are backed by powerful nations in the Middle East who in turn support a variety of client states and political organisations. The most powerful Sunni-supporting state is Saudi Arabia which is currently engaged militarily in Yemen to oppose the Shia Houthi rebels while Iran is regarded by most Shia’s as its spiritual and temporal leader.

For example, in the long-running civil war in Syria President Bashar al-Assad is backed by the Alawites, a sect close to the Shias whereas many of the hardliners ranged against his regime are Sunnis – amongst them the influential Jabhal al-Nusra Front. To complicate matters the recently formed Islamic State is also Sunni and is part of the fight against Assad. In neighbouring Lebanon Hezbollah is a Shia sect and as it supports Assad it is seen as a threat to the largely Sunni opposition rebel army and this too will have an impact as Hezbollah receives the bulk of its support from Tehran.

It is a problem which will not go away and is one which dominates any strategic realignment in the Middle East where the divide between the Sunnis and the Shias is as deep and troubling as any other schism in the world. It colours not just religion but also politics and it is taken extremely seriously inside the worldwide Ummah or Islamic community. So influential is the split that it colours the way people think and behave and its toxicity is now a dominant factor not just in the civil war in Syria but also right across the Middle East.

The enmity is rooted in the distant past yet it is central to the way Muslims view themselves and their sense of place in the world. In 632the Prophet Muhammad died and left behind him a disputed succession which has never been satisfactorily resolved. Briefly stated, the Sunni sect believes that Muhammad’s rightful successor as Caliph of the Islamic community was Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad’s wife Aisha; on the other hand the Shias contend that Muhammad passed the succession on to his cousin and son-in-law Ali, the husband of his daughter Fatimah.

Inevitably perhaps the differences of opinion led to fierce disagreements which often spilled over into violence, even warfare, but there have also been equally long periods of co-operation and happy coexistence. In time the split was also coloured by differences of opinion over such important matters as religious doctrine and practice, interpretation of traditions and jurisprudence. These differences generally surface and become more contentious in time of social tension or political confrontation.

From the outset the Sunnis have been in a numerical majority and at various points and in some Arab countries this has led to the persecution of the Shias. Both sects have sub-divisions and although there have been periodic attempts by both sides to encourage harmony and a closing of ranks the split remains as wide as ever. Last week’s agreement over Iran’s nuclear policy might have brought some comfort to Tehran but the repercussions will be felt across the Middle East for years to come. As a Saudi diplomat tweeted last week the deal would do nothing but wreak havoc in the region: “We have learned as Iran’s neighbours in the last forty years that goodwill only led us to harvest sour grapes.”

The deal and what it means for Israeli fears of nuclear war

Throughout the discussions with Tehran about the need to find a way to allow Iran to develop a nuclear industry for peaceful domestic purposes the sub-text was the absolute necessity of avoiding any loophole which would permit the development of nuclear weapons thereby creating an arms race and plunging the region into disarray. For that reason the deal was denounced by Israeli hawks as a trap which provided short-term tactical concessions in favour of a capacity to introduce long-term weapons development which would allow Iran to dominate the Middle East during the first half of this century.

It was therefore only to be expected that the complaints were led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu who accused the west of caving in to Iran and giving comfort to Islamic hardliners. During a visit by the Dutch foreign minister to Bert Koenders Netanyahu made his feelings clear by telling him that “Iran will get a jackpot, a cash bonanza of hundreds of billions of dollars, which will enable it to continue to pursue its aggression and terror in the region and in the world. This is a bad mistake of historic proportions.”

Again this was only to be expected. Not only are Iran and Israel long-term rivals with ambitions to be the leading powers in the Middle East but there have been occasions in the recent past when hardline Iranian leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed a wish to see Israel wiped off the map. Clearly possession of nuclear weapons would assist that disgraceful ambition and this helps to explain some of the concerns expressed in Jerusalem last week, mainly by the right wing but also by moderate Zionist politician such as Yesh Atid, leader of the Yair Lapid (There is a Future party).

However, these concerns have been balanced by a realisation that the deal might get banish the “Iranian threat” to history and create the conditions for a nuclear-free Middle East – after all, the agreement has been guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which Iran had been previously able to exploit. Pragmatists such as Avner Cohen, professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California and author of “Israel and the Bomb” now argue that the agreement could herald a new beginning in Israeli foreign policy by getting rid of “manipulative scare-mongering” and allowing the issue “to be dealt with quietly in the professional settings that it deserves.”