SIR Stephen House entered 2015 wounded but still standing. As chief constable of Police Scotland, he had endured criticism over his policies on armed officers and stop and search, but he retained political support in the Scottish Government.

Twelve months on, House cuts a different figure – a tarnished ex-police chief who brought forward his retirement amid scandal and controversy.

House’s annus horribilis 2015 was a combination of failing to close down rows from the previous year and new disasters he failed to contain or explain.

In February, months after one of his police chiefs had promised that the “indefensible” practice of so-called consensual searches on children had ceased, his force admitted the tactic had continued.

The row triggered a fundamental review of House’s flagship search policy, which recommended the abandonment of all “consensual” frisks.

In May, Sierra Leonean national Sheku Bayoh, a father of two, died in custody after an ugly Kirkcaldy street incident. Weeks later, in what was House’s blackest hour, it emerged that police had taken three days to respond to a call about a crash on the M9.

John Yuill is believed to have died upon impact, but passenger Lamara Bell was only critically injured and died in hospital a week after the crash.

In August, the Sunday Herald then revealed how the force’s Counter Corruption Unit – set up to weed out corruption – had broken the law by illegally using snooping legislation to flush out suspected journalists’ sources.

Weeks later, against this backdrop of mounting political pressure, House brought forward his retirement and announced a December exit.

However, all these scandals have their own individual explanations.

Bayoh’s death is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner, and has been marked by a series of claims and counter claims by figures close to the deceased and the officers.

A final judgement on the exact details is pending, but it seems reasonable to suggest Bayoh may still be alive were it not for his contact with police.

The M9 failure was in no way wilful, but raises serious questions on cuts to police budgets implemented by House.

With health spending protected by the Government, local authority and justice budgets were targeted for cuts as ministers tried to balance the books.

By far the biggest chunk of police spending is on wages, so by insisting on maintaining police officer numbers the Government closed down the option of making cuts by reducing headcount.

The only alternative was to slash civilian staff posts, which has resulted in police officers “backfilling” such posts.

It has been widely reported the M9 response delay occurred after an officer untrained in the call-handling procedures at the Bilston Glen contact centre failed to pass on crash details.

But the stop and search scandal can directly be placed at House’s door and it revealed deep-seated problems with his style of policing.

When House was chief constable of Strathclyde Police, stop and search was his signature policy. But without any consultation, House wheeled it out across the country when Police Scotland was formed: many searches were revealed to be “non-statutory” – some on young children, who critics argued were in no position to provide consent.

If non-statutory searches had been rare, few would have cared, but that they accounted for hundreds of thousands of searches raised real concerns.

The policy crumbled this year: Police Scotland’s promise in 2014 to scrap all consensual searches on under-12s was shown to be false, after which Justice Secretary Michael Matheson announced the policy’s demise.

It was a humiliation for House, a setback from which he never recovered.

The row over the force’s illegal spying on journalists’ sources was another dark chapter.

His counter-corruption unit – again, a country-wide version of what had existed at Strathclyde – was supposed to uphold the law, not break it.

Police officers long complained the CCU pursued tiny data protection issues with zeal, but also muttered about unethical practices inside the Unit.

When the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office finally confirmed the CCU illegally used spying laws to flush out journalistic sources, few in the force were surprised.

It is also believed to have ended deputy chief constable Neil Richardson’s hope of succeeding House – he had responsibility for the Unit – and has led to special hearings at the Scottish Parliament, to continue in the New Year.

Abject public appearances also contributed to a sense of chaos.

In February, House told the Scottish Police Authority he had been forced to release disputed stop and search data by the Scottish Information Commissioner, which turned out to be untrue.

A later session in front of MSPs showed House to be tetchy when pushed on his struggling leadership. One insider said it showed the chief constable was not used to being challenged and did not cope well with it.

In October, the findings of the in-house Police Scotland staff survey also showed that House was losing the support of his own staff.

A third of the workforce wanted to leave the organisation within three years of its establishment; barely a quarter of officers felt they had the resources required to do the job properly. Under 10% of employees believed the force was interested in their wellbeing.

This toxic mix of fatal errors, spying on journalists' sources and low morale contributed to House’s early retirement – as did ebbing political support in St Andrew’s House.

Kenny MacAskill, the ex Justice Secretary, supported him on the key controversies. But Matheson, who succeeded MacAskill, aimed for a more detached relationship – the new Justice Secretary did not lose any sleep when House brought forward his retirement.

House’s departure, and the imminent arrival of successor Phil Gormley, now presents an opportunity to analyse what has gone wrong.

One false diagnosis is that the single force’s problems stem from a lack of accountability or scrutiny.

In the days of the eight territorial forces, sleepy local authority boards failed to provide any meaningful oversight of their local police service. No-one looks back on those days with any pride. Equally, the Scottish Police Authority, supposed to be the single force’s oversight body, has by common consent been a failure and the departure this year of chair Vic Emery was welcomed.

Healthy media and political scrutiny has helped to flush out bad practices.

Police officers in legacy forces always had limited access to guns, but the development of a national policy has been tested and challenged like never before.

House believed his Strathclyde approach to stop and search would be business as usual, but he was held to account by MSPs, journalists and the academic world.

And the CCU falsely believed it could continue its methods in the shadows.

The problems faced by the single force are now regularly raised at First Minister’s Questions, to squeals of political “interference” by vested interests in the policing world, preferring the old regime of deference over scrutiny, but they sound increasingly self-serving.

In some ways, the increased focus on policing mirrors the necessary transparency devolution brought to governance in Scotland.

Before the inception of the Parliament, the old Scottish Office was held to account intermittently at Westminster for its executive decisions. Post-devolution, ministerial decisions were under a 24/7 media spotlight, subjected to daily questioning by the Opposition.

House ran Strathclyde without internal or external challenges: paradoxically, the success of Police Scotland has been the exposure of his flawed policies and management style.

Gormley, who has come out of retirement to lead Police Scotland, now has an in-tray of problems and an unenviable job of transforming the reputation of a troubled public service.