What Blair said to Bush: the 525 day route to the Iraq war that spawned a Commons contempt motion

Memos from Blair to Bush in the lead up to the war has provided the impetus for a bid by MPs to subject the former prime minister to a Parliamentary contempt motion.

Blair has always hotly denied the claim that the he had signed a deal ‘in blood’ with Bush at Crawford to embark on the war, which started on March 20, 2003.

The same night of the 9/11 atrocity, the worst loss of life due to a terrorist incident on US soil, President Bush said the US was "at war with a new and different kind of enemy".

The following month, attacks were launched on Afghanistan by western coalition forces in conjunction with the anti-Taliban Afghan Northern Alliance.

Meanwhile an October, 2001, memo from Bush to Blair while suggesting a military operation to deal with Omar or Osama bin Laden accepted that extending the war aims to Iraq was at least under consideration. Two months later in a separate memo Blair set out a plan of action to undermine Iraq president Saddam Hussein, supported by military action "when the rebellion finally occurs".

Blair advised Bush in October: "I have no doubt we need to deal with Saddam. But if we hit Iraq now, we would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact on Pakistan. However, I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam deliverable at a later date."

The official inquiry report into the 2003 war unveiled on Wednesday was strongly critical of Mr Blair's government and UK military chiefs. It said Mr Blair had overstated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, sent ill-prepared troops into battle and had "wholly inadequate" plans for the aftermath of the conflict.

While details of Bush's views were kept from the Chilcot agenda, one White House memo written a week before the Crawford meeting and a year before the Iraq invasion reveals how the US felt that the UK were partners in war.

The memo from Secretary of State Colin Powell written on March 28, 2002, told Mr Bush that Mr Blair: “…continues to stand by you and the US as we move forward on the war on terrorism and Iraq. On Iraq, Blair will be with us should military operations be necessary. He is convinced on two points: the threat is real; and success against Saddam will yield more regional success."

But Mr Bush was warned that Blair faced divisions within his cabinet and that the Labour Party and the British public were unconvinced that military action was "warranted now".

He said: "Blair may suggest ideas on how to (1) make a credible public case on current Iraqi threats to international peace; (2) keep Iraq’s neighbours on our side; (3) handle calls for a [United Nations Security Council] blessing that can increase support for us in the region and with UK and European audiences; and (4) demonstrate that we have thought through ‘the day-after.’ “The UK will follow our lead in the Middle East, but Blair may seek greater US engagement.

“Blair knows he may have to pay a political price for supporting us on Iraq, and wants to minimize it. Nonetheless, he will stick with us on the big issues."

It was three months later that Mr Blair was to write the infamous 'I will be with you, whatever' handwritten letter to Bush, which he has insisted was not an irrevocable commitment to war.

Chilcott concluded that after the 9/11 attacks the West abandoned its previous policy of "containment" in favour of stamping out threatening regimes, either through diplomatic or military efforts.

By December 3, there was what Chilcot says was a "significant development of the UK’s approach. Mr Blair suggested to Bush a “clever strategy” for regime change with the overthrowing of Iraq president Saddam Hussein.

That began with "softening up first" drawing attention to breaches of UN resolutions, saying regime change is desirable, signal willingness to support opposition groups and mounting covert operations with groups with the ability to topple Saddam. Meanwhile they would demand weapons inspectors go back in "and without specifying that we will take military action if the demand is not met, we let it be clearly seen that nothing is ruled out".

He describes how it was "presentationally difficult" and adds: "We need to be very precise to avoid getting drawn into threats we are not yet ready to implement. But we would be unsettling Saddam; possibly forcing concessions out of him .. and giving ourselves room for manoeuvre."

Blair's memo describes how "when the rebellion finally occurs we back it militarily". He adds: "They need to know, and we need to be clear, that if an uprising occurs we are williing to act militarily in support."

The prime minister told Bush that the situation would build over time until "we get to the point where military action could be taken if necessary; but meanwhile bring people towards us, undermine Saddam, without so alarming people about the immediacy of action that we frighten the horses, lose Russia and/or half the EU and nervous Arab states and find ourselves facing a choice between massive intervention and nothing."

A Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of February 27, 2012, over a year before the Iraq invasion and a Cabinet Office ‘Options Paper’ of March 8 concluded that a large scale ground invasion was the only sure way to remove Saddam Hussein.

By March 17, Tony Blair in a pre-Crawford minute to chief-of-staff, Jonathan Powell, explained his concerns about public opinion over Iraq was "fragile" and "the persuasion job on this seems very tough" as he accepted that the issues over weapons of mass destruction "don't seem obviously worse than three years ago".

But he added: "Yet from a centre-left perspective, the case should be obvious. Saddam’s regime is a brutal, oppressive military dictatorship. He kills his opponents, has wrecked his country’s economy and is source of instability and danger in the region. I can understand a right-wing Tory opposed to 'nation-building' being opposed to it on the grounds it hasn’t direct bearing on our national interest.

"But in fact a political philosophy that does care about other nations – eg Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone – and is prepared to change regimes on their merits, should be gung-ho on Saddam. So why isn’t it? Because people believe we are only doing it to support the US; and they are only doing it to settle an old score. And the immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously worse than three years ago.

“So we have to re-order our story and message. Increasingly I think it should be about the nature of the regime. We do intervene... We have no inhibitions – where we reasonably can – about nation building ie we must come to our conclusion on Saddam from our own position, not the US position."

Five days later defence secretary Geoff Hoon wrote that the UK “should support President Bush and be ready for a military contribution” for Iraq.

Hoon told Blair that one of "your objectives at Crawford should be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation in US military planning …”

Hoon proposed that Mr Blair might raise with Present Bush “the need for a comprehensive public handling strategy, so that we can explain convincingly why we need to take such drastic action against Iraq’s WMD now”.

Peter Ricketts, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in a personal minute advised foreign secretary Jack Straw that the US's "scrambling" to establish a link between Iraq and al Qaeda was "so far frankly unconvincing".

"To get public and parliamentary support for military operations we have to be convincing that: the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops to die for [and] it is qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are closer to achieving nuclear capability (including Iran)."

He added: "Military operations need clear and compelling military objectives … For Iraq, ‘regime change’ does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge match between Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have suggested, to make the objective ending the threat to the international community from Iraqi WMD before Saddam uses it or gives it to terrorists. That is … easier to justify in terms of international law, but also more demanding."

Chilcot received evidence that in a conversation with Secretary Powell, on March 25, Mr Straw felt entirely comfortable making a case for military action to deal with Iraq’s WMD and could even say that the means of meeting those concerns might be regime change, but this could not be the objective.

A day later legal adviser Michael Wood in a memo to Mr Straw's office warned that in order for military action to be justifiable under international law, there must be an acceptable legal basis. In the case of military action in relation to Iraq's WMD this must be either self-defence or a Security Council authorisation.

When it came to the Crawford summit, Sir David Manning, the former prime minister's foreign policy adviser, recorded that Blair and Bush had discussed the timing of possible military action. If a decision was taken to use military action, that would not take place before late 2002/early 2003.

The record contained no reference to any discussion of conditions which would be necessary for military action.

Blair insisted in evidence to the inquiry: “The only commitment I gave [at Crawford], and I gave this very openly, at the meeting was a commitment to deal with Saddam.”

A letter from Sir Christopher Meyer, who was present in Crawford as Britain’s Ambassador to the US to Sir David on May 15 later indicated that Blair and Bush had also discussed the first quarter of 2003 as a timeframe for action against Saddam Hussein.

Mr Blair told Chilcott that there had been “a general discussion of the possibility of going down the military route but obviously, we were arguing for that to be if the United Nations route failed."

Sir Jeremy Greenstock who was Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations between 1998 and 2003 told the inquiry: “I was aware of the theoretical option to promote regime change through the use of force; but it was not until February or March 2002 that I heard that serious preparations might have begun in Washington for an attack on Iraq.

“It wasn’t until the Crawford meeting … that I realised that the United Kingdom was being drawn into quite a different sort of discussion, but that discussion was not made totally visible to me … nor did I have any instructions to behave any differently in the United Nations as a result of what might have been going on in bilateral discussions with the United States."

Chilcott concluded about the Blair-Bush summit: "The acceptance of the possibility that the UK might participate in a military invasion of Iraq was a profound change in UK thinking. Although no decisions had been taken, that became the basis for contingency planning in the months ahead."