THE European Union has agreed to continue economic sanctions against Russia. Introduced after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, they have been extended for a further six months. Division within the EU kept any further extension, or any broadening to include Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, out of the final deal.

The sanctions target the workings of Russian energy firms and arms manufacturers. There are asset freezes and travel bans for President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, as well as a squeeze on Russian financial institutions. Sanctions are designed to alter political decision-making through economic pressure. They are used to coerce, deter and punish.

They can be introduced by governments, or through institutions like the EU. Before 1990 the UN imposed sanctions just twice. Since then there have been more than 20 cases. The EU has almost 40 in place. With an increasing reluctance to use force, they are seen as a way to tackle international crises without a military footprint. Have they made a difference to Russia’s behaviour?

Not really. As they were introduced, Moscow tightened its grip on Crimea and increased tensions in Eastern Ukraine. Nearly 10,000 people have been killed since 2014. The Kremlin has shown little interest in the Minsk ceasefire agreement. Monitors have reported a spike in violence between Russian-backed rebels and Ukrainian forces. For now, stalemate and continuing low-level conflict suit Moscow.

Russia has suffered. The sanctions have been imposed on an already slowing economy in which oil, a major export, saw its price drop by 48 per cent. Banks have turned to the state for aid. The currency has plummeted. We have seen food shortages and price hikes. Millions have fallen into poverty while spending on infrastructure and healthcare has been cut.

This is Moscow’s fault. Yet many Russians blame the West for their economic woes and view sanctions as a way to humiliate and weaken Russia. They have been used by Moscow as political cover for the lack of structural reform. President Putin has avoided responsibility. His approval ratings sit at around 84 per cent. This shouldn’t be a surprise. Sanctions have a poor record in making a difference when it matters. Whether it’s North Korea, Cuba, Haiti or Iraq, the history of economic sanctions offers important lessons.

Sanctions succeeding economically doesn’t mean they will politically. Six months after introducing what were described as the most comprehensive sanctions against North Korea, Pyongyang fired its most powerful nuclear test. Authoritarian regimes will pursue their own narrow interests, even to the detriment of their economy and citizens.

Sanctions can bolster the targeted regime. They can help form a siege mentality or wartime spirit among the population. This can be whipped up and manipulated by regimes that control their media.

It’s no coincidence that much of the Russian population regard sanctions as a Western plot. Sanctions are not a humanitarian alternative to using force. Haiti and Iraq showed us the devastating effect they can have on the civilian population. The regime elite usually remain untouched. Why are they such a popular policy choice? They give a sense of action and authority to an international audience and can have a face-saving effect in crises when governments must be seen to be busy. When those wishing to act see few options between talk and military force, they are a vehicle to display moral outrage. As for the EU, it shows a unity that’s been noticeably absent elsewhere.

Yet sanctions are a short-term tool. Before imposing them it’s important to ask what they’re capable of, and what will count as a success. There appears little agreement within the EU on what it wants sanctions to achieve or whether they’re working.

Criticising economic sanctions should not be seen as wanting to be soft on Russian aggression. The danger is that, by inflating their value, complacency can set in. In many ways sanction renewal is the easy part. In dealing with a Russia increasingly prepared to stretch European resolve, Europe will need a degree of stability, unity and credibility it has been difficult to find. Relying on sanctions to do the hard work will be counterproductive, even damaging.

Lindsay Mackenzie is leading European security and Russia focused research for the Scottish Global Forum. www.scottishglobalforum.net