Nuclear power stations are not like coal or oil plants, or wind farms. They use uranium to make plutonium and a host of other radioactive wastes – and they have their own £100 million police force with 1,100 heavily armed officers.

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary is needed to stop terrorists, insiders or malcontents attacking, disrupting or stealing nuclear processes or materials. Radioactive waste could be made into a dirty bomb that could contaminate a city for generations. Intelligent insiders could turn any nuclear plant into a potential Chernobyl or Fukushima, and spray hazardous radioactivity across the country.

There are also risks of industrial espionage to help foreign powers with nuclear technology. The Chinese state power company keen to take a major stake in a new nuclear power station in southern England is facing spying charges in the US.

These are not threats to be taken lightly, and they require some serious policing. It’s therefore disturbing to learn, as we report today, that the civil nuclear police have reported 21 security breaches in the last year.

According to the police, the breaches are low risk, and have mostly been reported by those guilty of breaking the rules. That is not, however, entirely reassuring.

Are there breaches that no-one reports? Who has got their hands on lost or stolen police smart phones or identity cards? Who has seen the sensitive information that’s been emailed outwith secure systems? What problems are there that we don’t know about?

Politicians and campaigners are right to express concerns, and call for action. It is unclear exactly how much control the Scottish Government has, or even whether it is kept informed of security breaches.

Scottish ministers must pay attention to the dangers, and demand to know what’s been happening. They should make sure they are given explanations for all the incidents in Scotland, and check enough is being done.

In this day and age, the prospect of nuclear terrorism, sabotage or espionage is truly terrifying. We need to be as sure as possible that nuclear security is foolproof, or at least as foolproof as possible.