Charlie Jeffrey

Scotland has long had a reputation for being less sceptical about European integration than the rest of the UK, and in particular England. Since the late 1980s, when the Labour Party and the SNP each became unambiguously pro-EU parties, Scotland has lacked credible voices in mainstream politics prepared to pursue a Euro-sceptical approach.

That in part has to do with the weakness since then of the main forum the UK has had for airing opposition to the EU: the Conservative Party. Just as the Conservatives under John Major were tearing themselves apart over Europe, Scotland turned its back on the party, returning no MPs in the 1997 UK General Election, and just one at every UK election since. The Conservative Party in the Scottish Parliament has not made a big issue out of Europe and its leader, Ruth Davidson, has taken a clearly pro-EU position.

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It was long thought that ordinary Scots were not that different in their views on the EU than people elsewhere in the UK. More recent evidence suggests that they are – and decisively so. Scots are now significantly more positive about EU membership than people in England and Wales (though not, it seems, Northern Ireland). These differences matter not just for their impact on the EU referendum next week, but also for their possible implications for the UK’s internal constitutional debate.

In Scotland, the Brexit and independence debates have become firmly linked. Nicola Sturgeon first made this point shortly after the Scottish referendum when she argued that any Leave outcome in an EU referendum would need to be endorsed in each part of the UK, effectively claiming a Scottish veto over such a UK decision. The First Minister has made that point on a number of occasions since, while remaining careful to avoid being bounced into a second independence referendum before she believes she could win it.

The Herald:

Such a turn of events is not just a matter of political arithmetic either. As my colleague Nicola McEwen, writing in The Herald yesterday, pointed out, the effect of a Scottish Remain and a UK Leave vote may qualify as a material change and may even generate increased support for a second referendum, but “it would force the architects of independence to confront some complex and difficult issues over the kind of independent Scotland they could deliver”.

So, what do the polls look like when we take them nation by nation across the UK? Scotland and Northern Ireland are firmly in the Remain camp. Polls in Scotland have consistently averaged around 65 per cent for Remain over the last year. In Northern Ireland there are fewer polls but they average at more than 60 per cent for Remain. England and Wales appear split down the middle. Polls in Wales average at a wafer-thin margin for Remain.

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It is rare for polls to be conducted in England only. However, because of England’s size (84 per cent of the UK’s population) reliable data can be found in standard Britain-wide polls. A number of polling companies have been disaggregating a figure for England in their EU referendum polls, typically based on 800-plus respondents for telephone polls and rather more for online polls. What is striking is how results from phone and internet polls differ.

In telephone polls in England there is a clear margin for Remain. But in internet polls Leave edges it. This difference in findings has been the subject of much debate on Britain-wide polling, with proponents of the different methods claiming they have it right and expert adjudicators unable to come to a clear conclusion on who is right or wrong. This may matter hugely given the mix we have of two ambivalent nations and two Euro-enthusiasts.

The Herald:

There is a further dimension to this pattern of opinion which should be noted, which relates to voters’ sense of identity and distinguishes England from Wales. Data from the 2014 Future of England survey, a periodic academic testing of public attitudes in England, suggests that national identity plays a significant role in shaping opinion on the EU in England. This survey used the so-called Moreno identity scale, which asked survey respondents in England to place themselves on a five-point scale with "only British" at one end and "only English" at the other, with intermediate points in between.

The more "English" respondents felt, the more likely they were to want to leave the EU; parallel research suggests those feeling only Welsh/Scottish in Wales/Scotland were close to the average level of support for leaving the EU. So, even though in absolute terms English attitudes on Europe are close to those in Wales (but not Scotland), they are distinguished in England from those in both Scotland and Wales by their clear association with English national identity. Euroscepticism in England appears to be central to a new English nationalist sentiment.

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What does all this look like if we combine these nation-by-nation polls into a hypothetical UK-wide result? If (assuming an even turnout across the whole of the UK) telephone polling in England is right, then it looks like a clear, UK-wide Remain vote, with all parts of the UK voting to stay.

If internet polling in England is right, taking the averages in each part of the UK since the turn of the year, then we would see a tiny margin of victory for Remain at 50.44 per cent for the UK as a whole but with a slim margin for Leave in England (48.6 per cent voting Remain). We could expect a number of prominent voices in that scenario complaining of England being kept in the EU against its will, and perhaps challenging the legitimacy of the result in a "reverse-Sturgeon" way, calling for an English veto over the choices of those outside England. The incipient stirrings of an English nationalism, nurtured by the Conservatives in last year's General Election campaign and clearly evident in English attitudes to Europe, could well find a more robust platform.

But polling in the past few days seems to show a drift towards Leave. If England were to move even slightly further to Leave, say from 48.6 per cent to 48.0 per cent opting for Remain, there would be an overall Remain vote of 49.94 per cent, driven by England’s sheer weight of numbers. The overall outcome would in other words be an extraordinarily tight decision to leave the EU in which Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland would be pulled out of the EU against their will.

So in that scenario Nicola Sturgeon could be talking of material change (and given his comments in recent weeks we can be sure Alex Salmond would). A second independence referendum could be on its way. We might also be talking about the risk of upsetting the delicate balance of Northern Irish politics. The overall preference for Remain there disguises a big division of opinion in which most Unionists are for Leave and an overwhelming majority of Nationalists are for Remain.

Either outcome – Scottish or English majorities being overridden by the whole – could in other words bring significant consequences for the internal stability of the UK. One thing is clear: if the internet pollsters have it right, the UK’s relationship with the EU may not be the only thing in the UK Government’s in-tray next Friday.

Charlie Jeffery is Professor of Politics and Senior Vice Principal at the University of Edinburgh.