Low fertility rates and an ageing population mean we have to open our borders, finds Alan MacDermid.
Poor old Scotland. A shrinking and ageing population is doomed to slower growth in GDP, rising export prices and a creaking economy.
It is hardly the kind of future that will tempt young graduates to stay here instead of seeking fortunes elsewhere, or attract new workers from England and the rest of Europe.
However, without them we are sunk. This is the forecast contained in "Scotland's demographic trends: insights from Scotland's Demography Research Programme Findings," produced by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Scottish Government.
It is likely to prove contentious, particularly among experts who have recently been predicting a brighter future on the back of an upturn in the birth rate, the influx of migrants from eastern Europe and the beginnings of a reversal in the Scottish diaspora.
This isn't enough, according to the 21-page summary of the report's findings. If fertility and mortality follow its projection, annual net in-migration of 20,000 is needed to prevent the Scottish economy shrinking.
Scotland has recorded clear net immigration gains in recent years, but more could be done to improve graduate retention in Scotland and to encourage Scots and non-Scots to work in Scotland, say the authors.
Scotland is one of many developed countries whose fertility is below the average required to replace their populations. We have a total fertility rate of 1.62 in 2005, slightly above the average for the EU, but just over half the post-war peak rate of 3.09 in 1964. It is now lower than England and Wales (1.86) and Northern Ireland (1.94).
"There seems no prospect of an early return to replacement level fertility in Scotland, and it is 24% below that required to prevent population size falling," the report claims. Why are we such slouches at reproduction and why are our rates lower than the rest of the UK? It is a complicated picture, involving factors such as employment, education and lifestyle.
Men and women with higher educational qualifications are more likely to start their families later and less likely to have larger families than others. Those with no qualifications are most likely to have larger families - about one-third of these had three or more children, compared with nearer one in 10 of those with degrees. People working part-time had started their families earlier and had more children than those working full-time.
Having friendship networks played a role in encouraging women to have children, but a paradox enters here. The quality of the area in which women live appears to influence fertility decisions. Those who were more negative about their locality were more likely to live in urban than rural areas, and more likely to live in deprived areas. They also expected to have, or had, fewer children than those who were more positive.
The latter might be assumed to be in the better-off, better-educated sector, living in areas with low levels of crime and good schools - that is, the ones who have smaller families. What squares this circle is that the birth of an additional child continues to be more likely in a traditional family context where women are married and not working, and where they can afford higher-cost housing.
Another paradox is that Scottish women are no more likely than those in England to remain childless, and give birth to their first child when they are younger than English women, yet the fertility rate is lower. This seems to be because they tend to space them out more and stop sooner. It is less a question of intent than of responses to immediate circumstances. Also, black and minority ethnic women - of whom there are more in England - are more likely to have a third child than other women.
How far can we rely on immigrants to prop up the economy? In the mid-1960s, there was a net outflow of around 40,000 people per year, but since the early 1990s, inflows and outflows have been approximately equal, while in the last four years net in-migration gains have gone from 9000 in 2002-03 to 21,000 in 2005-06.
Maintaining or improving this current balance of migration could prove key to addressing the challenges posed by Scotland's ageing population and projected population decline, say the researchers. In 2004, the number of Scots aged 75 and over was equivalent to 11.3% of the working age population. By 2040, it will have increased to almost 30%. In Scotland, population ageing will be more rapid than in the rest of the UK because until recently it has been less attractive to immigrants of working age.
David Bell, professor of economics at Stirling University and one of the report's authors, warned there is going to be increased competition. "Other countries will open up to them migrants," he said.
"In order to sustain the level 20,000 net inward migration we will very likely have to look beyond the EU, and that will depend on UK immigration policy," said Mr Bell.
However, he points out, ageing is a world-wide problem and "something we will have to learn to deal with".
Much will depend on whether the recent upturn in births can be sustained in the long term. Can Scotland persuade those who leave to return home? Can the country keep hold of its brightest? Can government provide a country where people want to bring up their children? The very future of Scotland depends on coming up with the right answers.
Expert Opinion
Scotland's Demography Research Programme brings together a rangeof experts from across the country's universities. It included more than 20 researchers at five academic institutions. Contributors included:
Fertility
- Ian Dey, honorary fellow and formerly senior lecturer in social policy in the School of Social and Political Studies at Edinburgh University.
- Elspeth Graham, reader in geography at St Andrews University.
Ageing
- David Bell, professor of economics at Stirling University.
- Peter McGregor, professor and director of research at department of economics and senior research associate of the Fraser of Allander Institute at University of Strathclyde.
Migration
- Ross Bond, lecturer in sociology in School of Social and Political Studies at Edinburgh University.
- Alan Findlay, professor of population geography at Dundee University.
Falling Figures
Total fertility rate
- Scotland 1.62
- England and Wales 1.86
Average age at first giving birth - Scotland 27.42
- England and Wales 28.08
Interval before next birth - Scotland 3.5 yrs
- England and Wales 3.2 yrs
Interval until third birth - Scotland 4.1 yrs
- England and Wales 3.3 yrs
Family size - Scots' ideal number of children 2.48
- Scots' actual number of children 1.24



















