Before Glasgow's council housing stock was transferred to the Glasgow Housing Association in 2003, the cost of servicing the debt incurred to build the houses was so high that the council could not afford essential repairs and much-needed improvements. Transfer to a not-for-profit housing association, allowed new borrowing of £1000m and the promise of modernising the stock over 10 years. When the Treasury, under the Chancellorship of Gordon Brown, undertook to write off the city council's £800m housing debt, it was not only the local authority that benefited; so did the Scottish Executive, which would have had to undertake the repayments.

Before Glasgow's council housing stock was transferred to the Glasgow Housing Association in 2003, the cost of servicing the debt incurred to build the houses was so high that the council could not afford essential repairs and much-needed improvements. Transfer to a not-for-profit housing association, allowed new borrowing of £1000m and the promise of modernising the stock over 10 years. When the Treasury, under the Chancellorship of Gordon Brown, undertook to write off the city council's £800m housing debt, it was not only the local authority that benefited; so did the Scottish Executive, which would have had to undertake the repayments.

Under the agreement, the Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) is not allowed to make a profit from land which becomes available as a result of demolition and must pay 95% of any proceeds from the sale of land to the executive.

The argument now is that if the GHA could retain this money and re-invest it in infrastructure and new housing, some of the most blighted areas could be regenerated at a much faster pace. It is worth examination because under the present rules the newly-cleared sites can be developed by housing associations for social housing, but there is little or no incentive to sell them to private developers.

Seven areas of the city have been identified by GHA and the city council as "transformational regeneration projects" in a programme which would involve demolishing up to 9000 GHA properties and replacing them with new-build split between social housing and the private sector. The most salutary lesson of the long and chequered history of regeneration in Glasgow is that it is more effective where social housing is mixed with private development. Yet that happens only where private developers can be sure of demand. The areas identified for regeneration, such as Ibrox, Gallowgate, Lauriston and Maryhill, all have problems, but as long-established communities within easy reach of the city centre, they also have the potential to attract private developers. That will be more likely if good quality new social housing kick-starts the improvements, and the argument that the proceeds from one can fund the other to mutual advantage is attractive.

It could also help the stalled move towards the second stage transfer to more local control. If the present arrangements amount to a barrier to regeneration, there is a case for looking at them again. There must, however, be safeguards. Any change must fulfil the original aim of providing better, affordable housing. The proceeds from the sale of land must go into a dedicated fund and their use be accounted for. Changing the rules would have consequences well beyond Glasgow. Not only would it set a precedent for the other areas where stock transfer has taken place, but since the initial agreement was reached with the Treasury, a change in the package would need to be approved at UK level. It should not become a political bargaining counter; too many people have lived for too long in substandard housing to get it wrong now.