DAVID Pratt quite rightly urges that Britain should not once again become embroiled in Afghanistan (“We must avoid being drawn into Afghan conflict yet again”, The Herald, February 2). Sadly, all of the signs are that we will be.

It is no exaggeration to say that President Trump is more focused on his golf than any operational matters, civilian or military. Barack Obama was a disappointment but he at least maintained a modicum of operational oversight, something modern technology gives any head of state. Donald Trump’s management style, and he has one, is explicit on this matter. The generals are in charge at every level other than at the level of grand strategy.

Some military analysts are of the view, which they claim is already evidenced, that it is inevitable there will be more shooting and less diplomacy. Indeed as I pointed out in a letter last year when commenting on the swingeing cuts to the State Department budget, Defence Secretary James Mattis said: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately."

The configuration of Britain’s armed forces is not designed to counter a “Russian threat” for the simple reason there isn’t one. It’s designed for expeditionary wars in far-off lands. The resurgent bear is a simple, easily understood story to boost/protect conventional defence spending.

The building of the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers makes this indisputable. The 21st century carrier doctrine is completely different from its 20th century version. Then it was about air superiority in the Pacific or convoy escort duty in the Atlantic. Today it's about power projection in distant lands.

Not British power projection, that delusion was put paid to when the United States vetoed it during it during the Suez crisis.

The configuration of Britain's armed forces underpins the “special relationship”, which is very real. Not in the form explained by representatives of the establishment commentariat, but rather as latter-day imperial auxiliaries.

The role of imperial auxiliaries has over the years, even centuries, been the cornerstone of the foreign policy of many states. New Zealand, Australia and Canada were ours during the 20th century. Various German and Italian states provided well-trained and fully integrated troops that underpinned Napoleon's delusions in Spain and Russia.

Now in the early 20th century it is Britain's turn to be some else’s auxiliary, though you will be hard put to get British military think tanks like the Royal United Services Institute to even countenance it, far less admit it. Brexit of course sets the imperial auxiliary role, as I think Mr Pratt hints at, in concrete.

Bill Ramsay,

84 Albert Avenue, Glasgow.