The report by the Military Aviation Authority into the collision of two Tornado aircraft in Caithness two years ago, which is due to be published today, could not be clearer:

an onboard collision warning system fitted to the jets would have prevented them crashing into each other and saved the lives of the three men who died: Squadron leader Samuel Bailey, Flight Lieutenant Adam Sanders and Flight Lieutenant Hywel Poole.

The Ministry of Defence will not give its response until the full findings have been released, but what makes the conclusion of the report particularly hard to take is that the technology to avoid mid-air collisions was recommended for Tornados in the mid 1990s, and a potential system for the jets was identified a full four years before the crash. And yet Tornados were still without an early warning system by the time the crash happened in 2012.

As one of the worst accidents to hit the RAF in peacetime, the crash and its aftermath have unpleasant echoes of the official report into the Nimrod crash in Afghanistan in 2006, which concluded it was caused by a fuel leakage problem that had been identified as long ago as the 1980s. In both cases, the Nimrod and the Tornado, a risk was identified but no action taken, at a terrible cost to military personnel and their families.

At Armed Forces Day in Stirling at the weekend, the Prime Minister David Cameron paid tribute to those personnel and the outstanding contribution they make to the country, and yet, from the start, his government's defence review faced the charge it was driven by cost-cutting rather than what was appropriate for defence planning or national security. Now the government also has several questions to answer over the way it has handled the Tornado and whether it has lived up to its responsibility to make the safety of staff a priority.

The first question is why a decision on the warning system for the Tornado was delayed for so long and what the reasons were for that decision. The system is basic safety equipment that is fitted to every civilian aircraft as standard, and an off-the-shelf system appropriate for the Tornado was identified in 2008. Was the decision not to fit it down to cost?

The second question is what, if any, action has the MOD taken to improve its procurement procedures? The report indicates that the warning system for the Tornado was delayed, and at one point cancelled. The MOD must take action to make decision-making swift and decisive.

The final question is perhaps the most important if accidents like the Tornado crash are to be avoided in future: why has the system still not been fitted to the next generation of fighters: the Typhoons, which are based at RAF Lossiemouth and will in time replace the Tornados?

As Angus Robertson, the SNP's defence spokesman, said yesterday: "Why is it that we would send some of our most highly-trained service men and women, using some of the most expensive equipment that the MOD has at its disposal, into exercises and operations without a collision warning system?"

It is a good question. We await the MOD's reply.