The question of the admissibility of bad character evidence in Scottish courts balances on two points: do we want trials to be fairer for the accused, thereby reducing the potential for miscarriages of justice, or would we prefer more guilty individuals to be convicted ("Outcry at plans to reveal past convictions to juries", The Herald, May 23)?
Your reference to the 13 minutes taken for an English jury to find Peter Tobin guilty of Dinah McNicol's murder provides a rather extreme example. Although Tobin's history was well-documented, there was overwhelming evidence pointing to his guilt; the time taken for a Scottish jury to return a verdict as to his responsibility for the murder of Vicky Hamilton wasn't significantly longer. Of greater relevance are those cases that are murkier and in which consent is vital to a determination of guilt.
In light of the paucity of rape and sexual assault convictions, most of us would surely agree that such crimes required to be punished more frequently than the roughly 5% conviction rate suggests. On top of being subjected to such a crime, the impact on a victim's life of a guilty individual walking free cannot be understated.
The currently inadequate means by which to examine specific instances of offences that are usually committed in the absence of witnesses, and typically involve difficult questions of consent within a criminal justice system based on the need for corroboration, call for an alteration of Scots law of evidence. Given time and consultation with leading figures in the relevant fields, we can surely trust our legislators to draft in such a way that will ensure only the admission of similar fact evidence and other safeguards, such as defence challenges and protection against over-zealous cross-examination.
We must ignore scathing voices commenting on Scotland following England's lead on such legal issues and base our final judgment on the following question: do we trust a selection of our population to impartially judge a case on its own merits, even alongside persuasive past examples of behaviour that act as indicators of guilt?
I would suggest that although a cynical reflexive response might be no, when handed the galling responsibility of asking themselves serious questions, the answers to which have potentially devastating consequences, jurors are better placed to act reasonably than we might immediately think.
Ross Brown,
18 Drums Terrace,
Greenock.
I agree that an accused must be considered innocent until proven guilty beyond all reasonable doubt after all relevant evidence has been tested. But I am not persuaded that justice is necessarily served by non-disclosure of previous convictions for rape, sexual assault and homicide and would argue that a history of repeated offences could be helpful to a jury to progress beyond all reasonable doubt in relevant cases.
It must be very disturbing for a jury to hear a long list of convictions for similar cases disclosed after their not guilty verdict and to realise that they got it wrong, justice for the victim has not been served and that the accused is free to possibly repeat the offence.
In our adversarial court room system too often the perception is that this favours the person on trial, that technicalities are exploited by skilful counsel for the defence and that justice seems less important.
R Russell Smith,
96 Milton Road,
Kilbirnie.
