A GUNMAN shot dead in France and a coup d'etat in the West African state of Mali.

At first glance, these two foreign news stories of the past few days might not appear to have much of a connection. Look again, though, and al Qaeda feature in both.

Mohamed Merah, the main suspect in a wave of shootings that killed seven people including three Jewish children in France, died yesterday in a hail of bullets.

Though questions remain as to the extent of Merah's direct links with al Qaeda, he was a known sympathiser and had made trips to both Pakistan and Afghanistan where, according to the French intelligence service, he had trained with jihadist groups.

Around the same time Merah was holed up in a Toulouse apartment besieged by a Special Operations unit of the French police, in the far-off city of Bamako, capital of the West African state of Mali, renegade Malian soldiers seized power in protest at the Government's failure to quell a rebellion in the north of the country led by Tuareg rebels.

For some time now these Tuareg fighters deep in the Sahara desert have been struggling to carve out a homeland in Mali's north in an area called Azewad that also straddles parts of Niger, Mauritania and Algeria.

Although a disparate collection of different factions with varying political agendas, the Tuareg opposition have largely united under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and in recent months have made considerable battlefield gains.

Among the myriad reasons for this upsurge in their rebellion is the fact Tuareg tribesmen who fought alongside Muammar Gaddafi's troops in Libya have returned trained, armed, ready and willing to take on the Malian army. The other catalyst though may be the extent to which these Tuareg rebels are playing off, or even in some instances being supported by, al Qaeda's local affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

To be fair, the Tuareg and AQIM have not always seen eye to eye and the seriousness of their relationship is unclear. Indeed, some analysts suggest that, from the Tuareg perspective, the current situation simply presents fresh opportunities and circumstances in a very old struggle.

In the past, Tuareg rebel networks have had varying degrees of involvement with AQIM. For example, one former rebel leader, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, the deceased cousin of MNLA leader Ag Mohamed Najem, is thought to have maintained close associations with AQIM for financial reasons.

Smuggling drugs, fuel, arms, cigarettes and migrants across Tuareg territory is big business and the Tuareg are happy to charge Arab smugglers - including AQIM – protection fees for doing so, which not only creates revenue in this impoverished region but has helped fuel rebellion.

Some analysts have gone further in highlighting the extent of this relationship between the MNLA and al Qaeda's affiliate, pointing out Tuareg tribesmen have kidnapped Westerners in the Sahel region and that those Westerners somehow made their way into AQIM custody, perhaps after being traded or sold.

Such a take suits the Government of Mali, of course, which is keen to hype the Tuareg-AQIM "alliance" in an effort to draw even more support from the United States and Europeans in the fight against jihadism in their backyard.

In fact, if not for the perceived AQIM threat, the Americans and Europeans would doubtless pay much attention to the goings-on in Mali right now.

Whoever now takes power there will almost certainly find it in their best interests to paint the MNLA and Tuareg rebellion as being hand-in-glove with al Qaeda's AQIM affiliate, no matter how debatable this may be.

All of this, of course, will not be lost on the al Qaeda leadership who will take every opportunity to embellish the extent of their influence while fomenting unrest in Mali, Niger and their West African neighbours.

While geographically distant, what happened in Toulouse and Mali these last few days simultaneously revealed two new faces of the al Qaeda threat.

In Mohamed Merah we have seen the lone-wolf terrorist acting in line with the instructions broadcast on al Qaeda's online internet magazine Inspire by jihadist ideologues.

In Mali we have witnessed al Qaeda's ability to utilise political instability, foment unrest and seek out new recruits in lawless lands. In both these capacities, its terrorist franchise continues to make its presence felt.