Access to safe, affordable and effective means of fertility control – abortion and contraception – surely constitutes one of the most significant social developments of the twentieth century. Its increasing availability has, arguably, fundamentally altered women’s rights as well as the structure, health and welfare of the family unit. Crucial to this history is the 1967 Abortion Act, which reaches its 50th anniversary this week on October 27 2017. It is an important milestone for the bill that succeeded where six previous abortion bills had failed, and that spearheaded a wave of liberalising legislation across the Western world. The anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on Scotland’s position within this history.

Some will be aware that a Scottish politician was the architect of the Act: David Steel, a young Liberal MP for the Scottish borders. Shortly after the 1964 general election, Steel was offered the equally sensitive subjects of homosexual and abortion law reform. Both Private Member’s Bills had already been passed in the House of Lords and awaited a champion in the Commons. Given governmental reluctance to become embroiled in this deeply controversial subject, each abortion reform attempt was left to the ‘lottery’ of the Private Member’s Bill and the individual conscience of politicians. Steel opted for abortion because Scottish opinion was believed to be even more adamantly opposed to homosexual law reform.

In fact, when Steel put forward his 1966 Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill, many questioned the involvement of a Scottish politician in this thorny subject. Scots law classified abortion as a common law offence without strictly defined limits, so that it was possible to interpret it more elastically than its English equivalent. In the decades before 1966, the Scottish legal establishment considered abortion a matter of medical discretion, and advised that a pregnancy could be terminated legally by any medical practitioner when acting in ‘good faith’ in the interests of the health or welfare of his patient.

In addition, the mechanics of the law made prosecution more difficult in Scotland. Under English law a person could be found guilty whether or not the woman was actually pregnant, since the crime was not the abortion itself but the performing of an act with intent to procure an abortion. However, under Scots law, pregnancy had to be proven because the victim was the potential child. Furthermore, the high standard of proof called for in Scottish criminal prosecutions made it difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute an illegal abortion, since those involved – the abortionist, the pregnant woman and her family – generally had a joint interest in concealment.

Some of the earlier abortion bills were not drafted to apply to Scotland, if they were attempting to amend older English legislation. More importantly, the greater flexibility of Scottish abortion law might be compromised if it was brought into line with English law in some way. Thus Scottish ministers and policy makers vigorously questioned the applicability to Scotland of any attempt at abortion law reform.

So why did Steel’s bill ultimately include Scotland? The MP was subjected to advice and pressure from numerous sources, including the Abortion Law Reform Association and – as the son of a minister – the Churches of England and Scotland. However, the greatest single influence upon Steel appears in fact to have been a Scottish doctor. Dugald Baird occupied the Regius Chair of Midwivery at the University of Aberdeen, and claimed to Steel to be ‘the only person’ (doctor) actually taking advantage of Scots common law to follow his professional conscience. Baird chose to recognise an increasing number of social as well as medical reasons for abortion that might adversely affect a woman’s ‘health’ in the broadest sense. Most Scottish doctors were in fact unaware of their degree of autonomy. The differences between English and Scottish abortion law were not made clear to medical students, so most graduates believed abortion to be a crime unless the pregnant woman’s life was in imminent danger.

In keeping with his own active interpretation of Scots abortion law, Baird was also instrumental in ensuring that the law interfered as little as possible with the judgement of the doctor in the abortion decision-making process. Thus Steel’s Act ‘medicalised’ fertility control by requiring two doctors to certify that the indications for abortion existed. So in short, Scotland appears to occupy a prominent position in the history of the 1967 Abortion Act. In this dramatic and contentious history, two Scotsmen – not one – merit consideration: the actor in a supporting, as well as leading, role.

The writer is a lecturer in the history of medicine at the University of Edinburgh