IT was in Cairo's Tahrir Square back in 2011 that I first heard talk of Egypt's second revolution.

The country's Arab Spring uprising had only just begun and the streets were wracked with pitched battles between supporters of then President Hosni Mubarak and pro-democracy activists.

It seemed strange people were already talking of a second rebellion while still locked in a first round revolutionary contest.

But even back then, in those already uncertain times, Egypt's pro-democracy movement knew getting rid of President Mubarak was only the first step and their revolution would be a long-term work in progress. This week that proved to be the case, and things are still far from over.

'What now then for Egypt's revolution?' is the pressing question on the lips of all those with an interest in foreign affairs.

If one thing is certain among the dizzying speculation surrounding Egypt's latest crisis, it is that the military's turfing out of President Mohamed Mursi serves as much as an indictment of the country's political class as it does a threat to their future ambitions.

Put another way, the army's running of the show will bring no closer any solution to the underlying failures that have bedevilled Egypt's political rollercoaster transition since those hopeful days back in 2011.

The very fact the army has had to step in is a clear sign Egypt's political community has overwhelmingly failed to deliver any significant progress towards stability and reconciliation.

Many among the new grassroots Tamarod rebel protest movement behind the recent nationwide demonstrations against Mr Mursi may be singing the praises of the army. They may even take some peculiar comfort from yesterday's aerobatic display by the Egyptian airforce over Cairo that saw the country's equivalent of the Red Arrows draw a vapour trail heart in the skies over the city.

But deep down those same pro-democracy protesters know they may soon rue the day they supported the coup.

Remnants of the Mubarak regime still lurk within the military's ranks and there is no love lost between them and the Arab Spring generation.

And speaking of the coup, why all this hand wringing over what kind of coup it was? If it looks like a coup, moves like a coup and has the same outcome any military overthrow of a democratically-elected government has then let's call it for what it is – a coup.

Admittedly, it is all too easy from afar to criticise the Tamarod's relative welcoming of the Army's intervention. But as a Cairo-based friend put the alternative case in an email to me yesterday: "Try seeing it from the perspective of people here who have had to live with the failings of Mr Mursi's government, its failure to address high unemployment and the familiar creeping nepotism and authoritarian attitudes we had to stomach for so long under Mubarak."

In Mr Mursi's defence, some might argue a few years is nowhere near enough to make event a dent in solving Egypt's protracted and deeply debilitating economic problems. But Egypt – like so many parts of the Middle East today – is a place where those people who have tasted greater freedoms are in no mood for taking their foot off the gas when it comes to ushering in change.

For the moment, the Army has drawn up what it calls a post-Mursi roadmap. This includes moves to a civilian, transitional technocratic government, the creation of a Supreme Constitutional Court to prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections and a "charter of honour" to be drawn up and followed by the Egyptian media.

These are welcome, significant and necessary steps. Ultimately though, in assessing where Egypt's revolution goes from here it is important to recognise the country's crisis goes much deeper than the recent political chaos.

The simple fact is Egypt is running out of money. Dwindling foreign reserves point to a negative balance of payments that is sapping central bank resources while at the same time Egypt's reliance on foreign supplies of fuel and wheat is growing.

The US-based independent global intelligence monitoring group Stratfor also points to the challenges faced by Egypt's extreme vulnerability to international food markets.

The Egyptian press frequently runs stories warning of food shortages and, while they so far have not appeared on any great scale, there are growing concerns. This would fuel even more instability and is a challenge any new administration needs urgently to address.

All this can only happen after the Muslim Brotherhood, Tamarod supporters and the military bury the hatchet. The current situation, however, suggests we are some way from that yet.

The overthrow of Egypt's moderate Islamist Government also undermines international efforts to bring radical Islamists into the political mainstream in the wider Arab and Muslim world.

Mr Mursi's ouster has effectively set a precedent where future presidents must ponder the fate of being removed from office by the military in the event of pressure from the masses.

There may be some temporary respite in the Tahrir Square clashes for now, but there remains the real threat of spiralling violence. Three scenarios present themselves in the coming weeks and months.

The best is the confrontational dust will settle and some political structure from the post-Mursi political roadmap might be take hold.

The most likely is the country for the foreseeable future becomes trapped in a cycle of shaky governments, military interventions, and street protests.

The worst case scenario is a violent backlash takes grip and this leads to state collapse and civil war.

Looking back to those days of 2011, it is clear the Arab Spring uprising allowed Egypt one step forward in terms of democratic legitimacy. With this week's coup it has perhaps taken two back. The hope must be this in turn does not become a full-scale retreat.