WHERE does Nicola Sturgeon’s SNP go from here? A party that swept the board in Westminster two years ago has contrived to make the return of a strong majority of MPs feel like defeat. A leader who is normally so sure-footed talks now of “taking time to reflect” on the prospect of a second independence referendum.

So much for the “triple lock” envisaged in the party’s manifesto less than a fortnight ago, where a majority of Scottish seats would deliver a mandate for a second poll. This weekend, with 21 seats lost, that seems forlorn.

The polls now say support for independence is higher than that for the SNP. The party appears more popular than its leader. This is a problem when “personality politics” replaces policy, as Theresa May has discovered. Ms Sturgeon has been a little like the Grand Old Duke of York, marching the faithful up Mount IndyRef2 whenever they became restless. The original date demanded for another referendum, 2017, slipped quickly to 2019.

There have been some baffling moves on Brexit too. The SNP leader’s response, issued immediately after last June’s poll, seemed smart, especially as the rest of British politics was in such disarray. Her demand for a place at Brexit negotiations appeared to win support from Mrs May when she visited Edinburgh after replacing David Cameron. At some point afterwards the picture became less clear.

When the Brexit vision hardened last autumn, the First Minister’s insistence that, whatever happened, Scotland must retain access to the EU single market, seemed illogical. While the UK exited, somehow a special dispensation must be made for one part of the UK to keep a foot in the door. How might that happen? Why would the EU agree to it? Why should a Brexited UK concede it? There was no real explanation.

Months later, the demand was toned down. An independent Scotland might emulate Norway, or Iceland, or anybody really that would allow some form of access that wasn’t enjoyed by the rest of the UK. By the time Mrs May called Thursday’s snap election, the SNP position on post-Brexit Scotland was unconvincing.

The reasons for all this lie in a distinct lack of strategy. Alex Salmond led the SNP to victory in 2007 and 2011 on the back of a long-nurtured relationship with parts of Scotland – the east and north-east particularly – that did not necessarily support nationalism. While his politics were of the left, his pragmatism won respect and even attracted political funding.

His appeal to voters may have waned among No voters particularly in 2014, but there is no disputing his record. Some strategic decisions may have seemed to been made up in the back of the ministerial car, but for the most part they carried logic.

His successor is less decisive. Her realisation that a significant minority of SNP supporters actually voted for Brexit came late. Last year’s mass consultation on independence was never published. A “growth commission” created to consider economic options has failed to report anything in public.

Ms Sturgeon’s reputation in rural Scotland is brittle. She is seen as a central belt politician who speaks to an urban working class narrative. Remarkably, her inclusion on campaign literature has been seen as toxic in some quarters.

The FM is a sincere politician. But she is said to rely too much on her own instincts, and on a small group of confidantes led by her husband, the party’s chief executive. She needs a coherent plan, and an intelligent means of communicating it consistently to a wearying, sceptical electorate.

Those Yes loyalists who believe independence is simply inevitable are kidding themselves. Even the toughest Brexit may not push a majority towards independence. The SNP has a lot of hard thinking to do.