It is the Scottish political headache of the new century.

With Britain heading for a Brexit - possibly a cripplingly hard one - First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has to weigh up whether to stick or twist, whether to try and fight for the best EU deal in the UK or whether to go for independence. 

After The Herald's landmark Beyond Brexit series, EU expert Kirsty Hughes takes stock of the options facing Ms Sturgeon, UK Prime Minister Theresa May and the leaders of the bloc's other 27 member states.

First published by Friends of Europe, where Ms Hughes is a associate fellow, this article sums up the latest thinking on what Brexit means for Scotland. 

Introduction

On 23 June, the United Kingdom as a whole voted to leave the European Union. The vote to take the UK out of the social, economic and political relationships at the heart of the post-Second World War era continues to cause shockwaves in the UK and the EU.

The UK voted by a small margin for Brexit – 51.9% to 48.1% – on a high turnout of just over 72%. In England and Wales, a majority of voters chose the ‘Leave’ option but in Scotland and Northern Ireland the vote was for ‘Remain’. Scotland voted 62% to 38%, with a Remain majority in all its council areas. This split within the UK has unleashed a simmering constitutional crisis.

Some outside observers predicted that a UK ‘Brexit’ vote would lead to a rapid shift to independence by Scotland, just two years after the 55% to 45% vote in favour of staying in the UK. Yet while many independence supporters continue to hope for a second successful independence referendum in the coming years, few – if any – expected to face the potential challenge of another referendum so soon.

Furthermore, the UK leaving the EU complicates arguments for Scottish independence, even while giving one major new reason to argue for that independence. The question of future political and economic relations between the rest of the UK (rUK) and an independent Scotland looked much more straightforward when both Scotland and the rUK were expected to be full, independent members of the EU. A UK that is detached from the EU poses many more questions for an independent Scotland.

The shock of the Brexit vote has led to much political debate in Scotland. This debate relates not only to the independence option but also about whether there are ways Scotland could stay in the EU, or at least in the EU’s single market, even if, as looks likely, the rest of the UK (rUK) went for a more complex, ‘harder’ Brexit.

The Scottish government, led by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, has pushed for a real say for Scotland in the UK’s Brexit talks with the EU. She is also keeping open the option of a second independence referendum. Yet, perhaps surprisingly for the leader of a party committed to independence, Sturgeon has put most emphasis in recent months on exploring whether there is a genuine option that would allow Scotland to stay both in the single market and in the UK. She has promised an in-depth policy document on this option by mid-December.

First Minister Nicola Sturgeon

The Herald: nicola sturgeon conference pa.jpg

The independence debate continues to colour most politics in Scotland: the cross-party consensus that emerged in the early days after the Brexit vote, to explore all options to keep Scotland in the EU or in the single market, had already fractured by the first half of November.

Meanwhile the UK government has struggled to define its aims for Brexit talks with the EU. It has battled both politically and in the courts to deny MPs at Westminster a say in determining those goals and the right to vote on whether and when to make an Article 50 notification to the EU. A High Court judgement in October concluded that Parliament should indeed have a say. Theresa May’s government has appealed against that judgment to the UK’s Supreme Court. A hearing is due to be held in early December and a judgment is expected at the start of the New Year.

Campaigner Gina Miller outside the High Court

The Herald:

The Scottish government has been given permission to be party to the Supreme Court hearing, and the Court may now determine whether the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood should also have a vote on triggering Article 50, since leaving the EU will affect many devolved policy areas in Scotland. Under the Scotland Act, Westminster should not normally legislate on devolved areas without the Scottish Parliament’s agreement, although Westminster might overrule this (and many consider this provision to be a convention, and therefore not legally binding).

As well as potential influence through the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has the third-largest number of MPs at Westminster (54 in total), giving it multiple routes to attempt to influence the Brexit process, depending on how the political and legal battles unfold.

Yet as the politics of Brexit get ever sharper across the UK, what real chance has Scotland got to influence either the overall UK Brexit strategy in a positive way, or to carve out a separate route for Scotland? The next few months, into the first half of 2017, may be critical in determining the Brexit path the UK takes, the choices Scotland makes, and the main scenarios Scotland faces.

Is the UK headed for a ‘hard Brexit’?

The Brexit debate in the UK, and in Scotland, has become principally focused on questions around the EU’s single market. Political parties take different positions on whether the UK should aim to stay in the single market – like a big Norway – or just ask the EU27 for access to the single market, while no longer respecting free movement of people.

A recent Natcen survey found that the British public want to have their cake and eat it. 90% want the UK to stay in the single market after Brexit, but at the same time 70% want controls on immigration, rather than free movement of people. It appears that the EU27’s message that the UK needs to respect the four freedoms to stay in the single market has not got through. Given a choice between full free trade and controls on migration, the same survey found voters split 51% to 49% in favour of migration controls.

There has been remarkably little debate so far about the wider geopolitical issues that are raised by the UK standing back from EU foreign policies and EU neighbourhood policies at a time of multiple challenges both on the EU’s borders (from Russia to Turkey to Libya and more) and globally – from climate change to the new challenges posed by Donald Trump’s victory in the United States presidential election. This lack of debate reflects the ‘Little England’ mercantilist tone of much of the Leave campaign, but also has longer roots, stemming in part from the lack of any coherent, strategic European and foreign policy under David Cameron over the past six years.

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Theresa May has focused on trade so far. But May did, at her first EU summit in October, intervene on EU policy towards Russia, while also telling fellow EU leaders, somewhat bizarrely given the circumstances, that the UK would remain a ‘strong and dependable’ partner for them after Brexit.

The fact that, by autumn, the debate in Scotland too had narrowed to a focus on the EU’s single market raises many serious questions about the cautious way pro-EU politicians across the UK are responding to the political challenge of Brexit. In Scotland, it also shows how the independence debate dominates and colours all other political issues including the EU.

Prime Minister Theresa May

The Herald: Home Secretary Theresa May

One of the striking aspects of the referendum campaign was that the Leave side did not set out any one single option for how Brexit could or should unfold if they won. As a result, Leave voters knew what they were voting against but not what they were voting for, with a wide range of different factors playing some role – from ‘taking back control’ to putting more resources into the National Health Service, controlling migration, creating jobs, or more generally expressing dissatisfaction with current political elites. As different factions within the Tory party argue over how ‘hard’ a Brexit to aim for, the referendum vote provides little guidance. Moreover, the views of the 48% who voted Remain also should be taken into account in choices between different Brexit options.

Government confusion

Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in October shed some light on the direction of travel. May insisted that the UK would have its own migration rules and would not come under the authority of the European Court of Justice. She promised a ‘Great Repeal bill’ so that the UK would no longer take on board EU legislation. Pouring cold water on Scottish aspirations, she also announced that the UK would leave the EU “as the United Kingdom”.

This sounds like a hard Brexit. Yet within days of her speech, in the face of the possible loss of new investment from car manufacturer Nissan, Theresa May was making secret offers of support and reassurance to the Japanese company. May has said she wants a ‘bespoke’ deal with the EU while refusing to set out even an overarching set of aims, not least in the face of continuing cabinet divisions. In a speech on 21 November to the Confederation of British Industry, May acknowledged that business needed to know what the plan was, but once again failed to set out any clear, strategic aims for Brexit.

With her government having established a new Department for International Trade, and promising to promote free trade globally, the ‘bespoke’ deal May wants from the EU27 would appear to mean some sort of Canada-style trade deal (though with much better coverage of services) and not simply ‘falling off a cliff’ by reverting to World Trade Organization rules at the end of two years of Article 50 talks.

Yet even this much is still not fully clear. Pushed on whether the UK would stay in the EU customs union or not, May declared, in the House of Commons, that the choice was “not binary”. This suggests an attempt by the UK government to shield sectors like the car industry from post-Brexit barriers that will undermine their ability to manage ‘just-in-time’ production and supply chains across EU member states. More recently, the gaffe-prone Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, declared (to a Czech newspaper) that the UK was “probably” leaving the customs union, only for a Number Ten spokesperson to say the matter was still under discussion.

Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson

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It is hard, though, to see how the government could continue to stay in the customs union given the repeated rhetoric from May and her ministers presenting the UK post-Brexit as a leading promoter of global free trade. Nor are the EU27 likely to respond positively to what they would see as an attempt at sector-by-sector cherry-picking by the UK government. Theresa May has to contend with continuing divisions in the Tory party – between those who would like a Brexit far from the EU’s single market and customs union and those who want something as close as possible to the status quo while still looking like Brexit (something the EU27 are unlikely to countenance). She is also facing intense concerns and lobbying from many businesses who do not want the UK to leave the single market, at least when it comes to their specific sectors.

May has repeatedly said that the UK will have its own migration policy towards the EU and the rest of the world – with various comments from ministers suggesting controls may be more on low and unskilled workers than on professional elites. Whether the EU27 respond in kind or with different controls will not be seen until negotiations progress (and the level of immigration from third countries allowed to work in an EU member state is, anyway, a member state not an EU competence). There will be some irony if the ‘anti-elite’ Brexit vote ends up with elites still ably to travel and work freely in the EU, and lower-skilled workers facing constraints.

The Opposition

Political opposition divided with Labour in disarray Sterling has lost around 15% of its value since the Brexit vote, and the continuing Brexit uncertainty has already had an impact on investment decisions. In his 23 November autumn statement, Chancellor Philip Hammond announced additional borrowing of £122 billion by 2020 attributing £58.7 billion of that to Brexit. As the Financial Times commentator, Martin Wolf put it: “nothing can disguise the reality that Brexit is likely to make a UK economy already blighted by low and stagnant productivity still weaker.”

In the face of such challenging economic data, pro-EU opposition parties in the UK might be expected to be in a strong position politically, and to be challenging May’s Brexit plans as well as arguing to change minds on the EU.

Yet Labour, the largest opposition party at Westminster, continues to be distracted by its own bitter internal divisions. Its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is supported by the majority of party members but opposed by most of his backbench MPs. Around 63% of Labour voters voted to remain in the EU but the uneven distribution of votes meant that, in England and Wales, around seven out of ten constituencies currently held by Labour voted ‘Leave’ in the referendum. This, together with the Eurosceptic leanings of Corbyn and his influential Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell, means that Labour has provided little substantive challenge to May over Brexit since the vote beyond accusations of her presiding over a ‘chaotic’ Brexit.

Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn

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In recent weeks, Corbyn has repeatedly said that Labour will not oppose or delay the triggering of Article 50, even if the Supreme Court does confirm the High Court’s judgement that Westminster must have a say. Unlike the Liberal Democrats (with only eight MPs after their collapse in the 2015 election), Labour’s main position on Brexit is to aim for ‘the fullest possible’ access to the EU’s single market – a position not distinguishable from May’s call for ‘maximum’ access. But Corbyn has continued to say he supports an open migration policy, while a number of his colleagues on the right of the party have called for some controls on migration – a position closer to that of the Tories.

Meanwhile, the LibDems have called for the UK to stay in the EU’s single market, including free movement of people. Their leader, Tim Farron, has said unless the government commits to staying in the single market, including all four freedoms, his party will vote against triggering Article 50. The SNP MPs would probably vote against triggering Article 50 too, unless a decision is taken to abstain. The SNP would also support the whole UK staying in the single market – something Nicola Sturgeon recently called the ‘least worst’ Brexit option.

The LibDems have also said there should be a second referendum on the terms of the Brexit deal – with staying in the EU as the other choice on the ballot paper. There is obviously a major timing problem with this proposal, since the final UK-EU deal could take several years, and the initial exit deal should mean that the UK will be out of the EU by early 2019 if Article 50 is triggered by early 2017. This is unless the UK withdraws its notification – which some key EU figures have said is possible though others disagree. Labour has not said whether it would support a second referendum on the deal, though deputy leader Tom Watson said recently that it would be “highly unlikely” to back a second vote.

If the Article 50 talks gave a clear outline of the future framework for UK-EU relations, then it might just be conceivable that a referendum could be held on that framework before early 2019. At present, the politics of getting sufficient support for this in the House of Commons means a second referendum on the deal is unlikely.

No political leader is currently arguing to change public opinion, calling for the UK to stay in the EU given the likely damaging impacts of Brexit, and to have a second referendum without waiting to see the terms of any future UK-EU deal. Even in Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon is careful to say she respects the result of the vote in England and Wales. If opinion polls shifted, this might change, but current polls suggest the UK remains highly divided, with one recent poll reporting views very close to the 23 June result – 52% saying the vote to leave was right, 48% calling it wrong. Theresa May has insisted she rules out a second referendum and would doubtless prefer an early general election in the unlikely event of being overruled on this in the House of Commons.

As a hard Brexit in some form looks increasingly likely – both in terms of May’s goals and the likely tough EU27 response to any UK pitch for ‘maximum’ single market access without free movement of people – polls may change. Any downturn (as forecasters predict) in economic performance or substantial shifts in economic activity out of the UK could also have an impact on polls, but for now the confused politics of Brexit in the UK point to a continuing path to the EU’s exit door.

Customs union as an opposition rallying cry?

If the Supreme Court rules that the UK government must take a bill to Parliament to trigger Article 50, there will be opportunities for opposition parties (and the House of Lords) to put down amendments – even if the bill is very short. With a majority of only 14, the government could be vulnerable if pro-EU Tory rebels voted with the opposition. But the opposition is disunited. Many MPs are nervous of setting up a confrontation between Parliament and the people (or rather the 51.9%) and of the possibility of an early general election, with the Tories currently on 42% to Labour’s 28%.

Even so, there are some areas where the government could potentially be outvoted. Labour’s shadow Brexit secretary, Keir Starmer, has said Labour supports the UK staying in the EU’s customs union, as probably would the LibDems and SNP. If Corbyn does back this policy, might the House of Commons, with some Tory rebels, impose a softer Brexit on Theresa May – one that would stymie her chances of establishing the UK’s own global trade policy? It is a possibility. Yet a vote to include staying in the customs union in the UK’s Brexit strategy might well trigger a general election (if May can get round the five-year fixed-term rules) since the Prime Minister is unlikely to accept such a substantive opposition amendment to her Brexit approach.

The present political state of the Labour Party, with Corbyn and McDonnell frequently adopting different tones and policy stances to Starmer and others, suggests that such a confrontation in the Commons is unlikely. But in policy terms, at the moment, it also looks like the area of greatest unity for the opposition parties.

The fact that a vote on the customs union is the best, though not very likely, chance for united opposition in the House of Commons – rather than to stay in the single market or even to argue for holding a second referendum – shows up starkly the weakness and divisions across the opposition parties in how to handle the politics of Brexit, not least the unchallenging position of Labour.

It is currently unclear whether the conclusions of the Supreme Court or subsequent actions in the Commons or Lords might delay triggering Article 50 much beyond May’s promise of the end of March 2017. Delay will be unwelcome in the EU, not least because the next elections to the European Parliament are set for mid-2019. For now, given Labour’s promise not to delay the process, March remains the most likely date – with the House of Lords thought unlikely to block Article 50 if the House of Commons has voted for it.

Once Article 50 is triggered, tough talks lie ahead with the EU27 – on the initial exit deal, on whether the UK might get a transition deal and what it might look like, and on the final comprehensive UK-EU deal. Clarity on a transition deal is likely to come only fairly late in the two years of talks that Article 50 allows. Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s lead Brexit negotiator also said recently that the window for substantive talks is more like 14 or 15 months, not the full two years, given the need for the European Parliament to vote on and agree the deal.

Any transition phase, after the two-year exit talks end, is also likely to be time-limited and to involve continuing payments into the EU’s budget, assuming it allows substantial continuing access to the single market. One recent analysis suggested that if the EU27 offers a transition period it could be as short as two to three years.

Scotland in the face of Brexit

The uncertainty surrounding Brexit ranges from the nature of the final UK-EU deal, to timing, to the exit deal and the nature of any transition deal. In addition, economic impacts will continue to develop, and the possibility of an early general election will remain. In this uncertain context, for Scotland to develop an effective strategy to protect its own interests and avoid the worst impacts of Brexit is challenging indeed.

Overall, Scotland’s Brexit choices at one level are simple: Scotland can leave the EU with the UK while doing its best to influence the UK’s Brexit strategy; it can hold a second independence referendum with the aim of becoming an independent member state of the EU; or it can attempt to achieve a differentiated deal for Scotland, staying in the EU’s single market and in the UK. As part of those strategies the Scottish Parliament could also attempt to block or delay Brexit, though it would need to consider its ultimate goals in any such delaying strategy.

Holyrood

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For now, the declared strategy of the Scottish government is to explore options to keep Scotland in the EU and/or in its single market. The big shift, however, since early July has been the greater emphasis put on staying in the EU’s single market rather than the bigger political demand of staying in the EU. Both British and Scottish politics – even before bringing in the EU27 dimension – make this single market route a difficult path to go down.

The UK government is highly likely to oppose any substantially different deal for Scotland, while Scottish political debates and positions on the EU are seen, on all sides, primarily through the lens of independence.

A dynamic start in opposing Brexit

As British politicians floundered in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote, Nicola Sturgeon appeared to be the only political leader with a contingency plan. In the first week after the vote, Sturgeon set a motion before the Scottish Parliament calling for the Scottish government to explore options to protect “Scotland’s relationship with the EU [and] Scotland’s place in the single market.” The motion also emphasised that EU citizens remained welcome in Scotland. The motion passed by 92 votes to zero – the Tories abstaining but Labour, LibDems and Scottish Greens voting with the SNP in a remarkable demonstration of cross-party consensus.

During that first week, Sturgeon went to Brussels and met, among others, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. She also established a Standing Council on Europe to advise the Scottish government on options for Scotland’s future relations with the EU. The heavyweight Council includes two former UK permanent representatives to the EU, a former European Court judge, two current MEPs, the heads of two EU think-tanks, senior academics and others.

Jean-Claude Juncker

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In late July, Sturgeon set out five ‘red lines’ for Scotland’s future relationship with the EU. These cover democratic interests and respecting Scotland’s views; influence over rules that affect Scotland; maintaining Scotland’s interest in solidarity (from tackling crime and terrorism to climate change); economic interests, particularly the single market and its four freedoms; and social protection. Yet despite these tough tests, which it would be hard to meet without staying in the EU, Sturgeon and the Scottish government’s emphasis has increasingly shifted from arguing for Scotland to stay in the EU to a much narrower focus on staying in the EU’s single market.

A new, unprecedented level of Scottish European diplomacy has been under way since the Brexit vote. Since the end of June, Nicola Sturgeon, Michael Russell, the Brexit Minister, and Fiona Hyslop, the European and External Affairs Minister, together with other SNP MPs, MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) and MEPs, have been building networks across the EU, holding meetings with the European Commission and the European Parliament, and with political counterparts in several EU member states (not least Ireland and a meeting in August with Germany’s Europe minister).

The Commission President and First Minister

The Herald: Whether, when and in what ways such diplomacy may pay off is an open question but the EU27 are well aware that there is also a Scotland dimension to how Brexit politics may unfold. At the same time, SNP politicians have been liaising across the UK – including with the Mayor of London, the devolved assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland.

Political opposition grows

The first visit of Theresa May’s premiership was to Scotland to meet Nicola Sturgeon. Amid positive mood music, May told Sturgeon that she would “listen to options” on Scotland’s views on Brexit.

Yet by October, the mood had soured sharply. In her Conservative Party conference speech, May was uncompromising: “we will negotiate as one United Kingdom, and we will leave the European Union as one United Kingdom. There is no opt-out from Brexit.” Despite also promising to consult the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – through the Joint Ministerial Committee – and giving them a ‘hotline’ to Brexit Secretary David Davis, the approach was clearly a hard-line one.

In turn, at the Scottish National Party conference later in October, Nicola Sturgeon promised to bring forward for consultation a new bill paving the way for a second independence referendum, while at the same time holding back on committing to such a referendum and continuing to explore ways for Scotland to stay in the EU’s single market. The new bill was duly published for consultation a week later.

Yet despite the bill, Sturgeon was in many ways dampening down the hopes of some for an early independence referendum. In her conference speech, she talked of Scotland staying at the heart of the EU, and announced the opening of a Scottish trade office in Berlin (in effect, surely, a quasi-embassy). Her focus has increasingly been on whether Scotland could stay in the EU’s single market, rather than continuing to make a strong case for staying in the EU – the five red lines of the summer being replaced for now by this specific goal.

Whether this narrower approach reflects a genuine attempt to forge a cross-party consensus or, as some opposition parties claim, is an attempt to provoke a stand-off with Theresa May, or is part of a strategy to delay a decision on calling a second independence referendum is an open question. The challenge of Scotland potentially staying in the EU’s single market and in the UK is certainly one that is getting, and surely deserves, in-depth consideration (as emphasised in the cross-party report of the Scottish Parliament’s European Affairs Committee ).

Yet one result of Sturgeon’s current approach has been to dampen down substantially political focus on the big issue of Scotland voting to stay in the EU but currently being on track to leave the EU with the rest of the UK in 2019. In that sense, the Scottish Brexit debate – while in many ways distinct to that in England – for now has the same intense single market focus.

Independence debate looms over Brexit strategy

Despite this narrower focus on the single market, the cross-party consensus in late June (apart from the Tories) to explore options for keeping Scotland in the EU or at least in its single market fractured by the autumn. In November, a Scottish government motion to protect Scotland’s place in the single market passed by 65 votes to 32 (with 20 abstentions), with only the SNP and Greens (both pro-independence parties) backing the motion. The Tories and LibDems both voted against, and Labour abstained.

Scottish Conservative leader Ruth Davidson

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The politics of this are at one level diverse: the Scottish Tories voting in line with the UK government, the LibDems supporting staying in the single market at UK level but now voting against that in Scotland, and Labour, having previously supported Scotland staying in the single market, now abstaining (bringing them more in line with UK Labour). Yet underpinning this diversity of view is a simple line-up of unionist parties – Labour, Tories, LibDems – against pro-independence parties (the SNP and Greens) - the politics of independence dominating any compromise on Brexit policy.

So, the challenge of exploring whether Scotland could stay in the EU’s single market while also staying in the UK – the subject of a Scottish government paper due in December – has already become subsumed within the continuing independence debate. The irony here is that, if Sturgeon’s proposals are feasible, this could keep Scotland in the UK for several years at least. With the UK currently heading for a ‘bespoke’ Brexit outside the single market, exploring whether Scotland could in any way have a differentiated option seems appropriate.

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Unionist parties, however, see this as mere political rhetoric, so that when – as most anticipate – Theresa May rejects any chance for Scotland to stay in the single market, Sturgeon can use this to ratchet up support for independence, claiming that she did all she could to find a cross-party solution for Scotland.

But many in the SNP are very cautious about holding an early second independence referendum. The lack, so far, of a bounce in the polls in favour of independence since the Brexit vote, and the awareness that losing a second independence referendum would close the issue down for a very long time, means there is real uncertainty about whether and when to go for a second independence referendum.

Polls over the last six months suggest, if anything, lower support for independence in the autumn compared to the summer. Some polls in June showed 53% support for independence but an October poll found the same result as in the 2014 vote – 55% for staying in the UK and 45% for independence. Yet, offered a more varied set of options, there is no majority in Scotland for any one path. A September Panelbase poll showed 32% supporting Scotland being independent in the EU, 28% wanting Scotland to be in the UK and in the EU (not possible unless Brexit is halted), 11% wanting an independent Scotland outside the EU, and 24% wanting Scotland in the UK and not in the EU (with 5% ‘don’t knows’).

The 2014 Independence Campaign

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This indicates, as in the 23 June referendum, 60% or more of Scottish voters prefer staying in the EU but views on independence cut across Leave and Remain. How those wanting to be in the UK and EU would cast their votes in a second independence referendum, once Article 50 has been triggered and Brexit is imminent, is a key question, though for now the polls suggest no Brexit bounce. The SNP has been carrying out a grassroots ‘listening’ exercise with a survey of public views on these overlapping issues – what feedback they get from that may influence future strategic decisions on timing of a possible second independence referendum.

The Scottish Greens – whose votes the SNP would need in the Scottish Parliament to hold a new referendum – are more bullish than the SNP, wanting a referendum before the UK leaves the EU, amid concern that delay could mean missing the moment as well as taking Scotland out of the EU. Whether the UK government would agree to a second independence referendum is also an open question, with the UK government’s line being that the question was settled in 2014. Some have suggested that if the Scottish government asks for a second referendum, the UK government should impose a ‘sunrise’ clause saying this could be held only after the Brexit deal was negotiated (whether that would mean after the two years of Article 50 talks or until the final deal is done is also unclear).

For now, Sturgeon appears to be playing a long game. Many in the pro-independence movement had preferred, before the Brexit vote, the idea of a second independence referendum in the early 2020s. An early independence referendum in 2018 could still happen but is not widely seen as very likely. Key decisions are likely to be finally taken only in mid-2017 – after Article 50 has been triggered, after key Scottish local council elections in May, and also after the French presidential election.

Could Scotland stay both in the EU’s single market and the UK?

Whether Scotland could stay in the single market and in the UK is both a technical and a political question: could it be technically feasible if the rest of the UK (rUK) was outside the single market; would it be beneficial for Scotland or not; and is there any chance of the UK government or the EU27 agreeing to it?

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Such an option is unprecedented but the EU has implemented creative solutions in the past – including when the former East Germany came into the EU overnight, as German reunification took place, or with the current situation in Cyprus, where northern Cyprus is technically in the EU but the EU’s body of rules and laws is suspended. For Scotland to be in the EU’s single market while outside the EU (in the UK) is a mirror image of East Germany and northern Cyprus coming inside the EU while not meeting its laws and regulations. Scotland would meet the EU’s rules but be outside the EU with rUK. That it is a mirror image does not, though, tell us much about its feasibility.

Earlier in the summer, more ambitious options were also considered in the wider Scottish debate. The notion of a ‘reverse Greenland’ was put forward whereby Scotland and Northern Ireland might stay in the EU as a smaller UK member state, while England and Wales left. How such an approach could work is hard to see, since it raises many fundamental contradictions: it would require, for instance, Scotland and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, to take foreign policy and trade policy decisions at EU level while Westminster still took foreign policy decisions for the UK as a whole. The EU27 would be extremely wary of the precedent it could set and the complexity of any such a deal, but it is one that the UK government cannot be expected to ask for under any likely scenario.

Can the single market route work – and what about borders?

If Scotland stayed in the EU’s single market and in the UK then Scotland would have to continue to apply, as Norway does, all the EU’s relevant legislation and laws. This would require substantially more devolution of powers to Scotland than it currently has (or else Westminster would need to legislate for Scotland on EU laws while not legislating for rUK on those laws). This goes well beyond the powers that may return to Scotland after Brexit in line with the existing devolution of competences. If Scotland also asked to stay in the EU’s customs union, this would further differentiate rUK from Scotland .

In a situation, where Scotland was applying the EU’s four freedoms and rUK was not, there would need to be a judicial mechanism to solve any EU disputes with Scotland. Since Scotland would be a sub-state this would need to be a mechanism that the UK was in some sense responsible for, unless Scotland was given the right to make international legal agreements and so participate directly in institutions such as the European Free Trade Association Court. Even then, the EFTA states would need to agree that a sub-state could join – something that is not currently possible.

Beyond that, if Scotland were still, in some sense, part of the EU’s free movement of people then EU citizens would retain the right to work in Scotland. Scottish residents’ reciprocal right to work in the EU would require some sort of residency proof – whether this might be done through a residency indication on Scottish UK passports, through national insurance numbers, or some other way would need to be examined. Given that the UK would be a ‘third country’ from the EU’s point of view, the levels of ‘free movement’ for work in the EU for residents in Scotland would be a question for each member state to agree.

If rUK had a more controlled immigration policy, as Theresa May has promised, then this opens up the question of whether, if Scotland somehow kept free movement of people to and from the EU, there would need to be a hard border between England and Scotland. This may not be necessary – though it would be very politically sensitive. Yet, if the Common Travel Area across the UK and Ireland is retained, a goal that Theresa May has also supported, then immigration checks would be done at external, not internal borders of the Common Travel Area.

Furthermore, if EU citizens can still enjoy visa-free travel to the UK for business and tourism purposes post-Brexit, any effective work visa controls would need to be done either through residence or workplace controls of some sort – not at the port of entry. As a consequence, a hard border would not necessarily have to be the result of differences in migration policies between England and Scotland.

However, experience of devolved migration policies in other countries suggests the politics of retaining free movement of people in Scotland may be highly unlikely. EU citizens who stayed in Scotland for several years would eventually get permanent residence and even citizenship and could then move elsewhere in the UK – one Canadian study suggests this internal migration is a significant issue. For rUK to accept this politically given current attitudes to free movement is improbable.

If rUK eventually has a new bespoke trade deal with the EU while Scotland was in the single market, there might need to be customs controls at the Scotland/England border: this would depend on the details of the final deal. If Scotland and rUK were either both inside or both outside the EU’s customs union then a hard border would be unlikely.

Norway

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Norway, of course, is in the single market but not in the EU’s customs union and has an open border with Sweden – though with some checks on lorries (both physical and through use of cameras). Any solution to the challenge of keeping the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland open will doubtless look carefully at the Norwegian experience – although Northern Ireland, as part of the UK, would not be in the EU’s single market.

Unless a solution were found for Ireland, and that solution could also be applied to Scotland and rUK, then, if Scotland were in the customs union and rUK outside, a hard border might be necessary. It is possible that a solution for Ireland might even be found during the initial two years of Article 50 talks, according to Malta’s Prime Minister – indeed if a solution weren’t found then, as soon as the UK leaves, it would otherwise become a hard border. Whether such a solution might be circumscribed in ways that could make it hard for Scotland to imitate (at least while part of the UK) is a potential risk.

If both Scotland and rUK were outside the customs union, businesses would need to apply ‘rules of origin’ to third country imports that were part of Scottish goods ultimately being exported to the EU (as Norway does). Since Scotland would be in the single market and rUK would not, these rules of origin would probably need to apply to rUK goods too that came into Scotland and then went onto the EU (depending on the terms of the UK-EU bespoke deal). This would add complexity and bureaucracy but need not necessarily mean a hard border between England and Scotland.

The EU27 have made clear that the UK cannot be a full part of the single market without taking on all four freedoms. So there would, quite probably, be some significant non-tariff barriers for rUK services supplied to Scotland – not least in financial services (where the EU27 are unlikely to allow the UK its current levels of access).

Since Scotland trades much more with rUK than with the EU, it has been argued that it cannot be in Scotland’s interests to be in the EU’s single market and fracture the UK’s own ‘internal market’. Yet the UK internal market is currently simply a part of the EU’s single market and, as one academic has pointed out, the UK will actually need to create its own internal market after Brexit. Moreover, while certainly substantially larger than Scotland-EU trade, there are no official statistics on Scotland-rUK trade in goods and services.

The overall impact for Scotland of being in the EU’s single market while rUK is not will depend on what sort of trade deal the UK does agree with the EU27. If, for instance, the UK negotiates tariff-free trade for goods, and partial access to services markets, the costs and benefits to Scotland will depend on the economic gains of keeping full EU market access, while facing some barriers to trade in some services sectors within the UK.

The Fraser of Allander Institute has estimated potential costs to Scotland of being part of a UK Brexit at between two and five per cent of GDP ten years after Brexit. This depends on whether the UK went for a Norway option at one end of the spectrum, or WTO rules at the other. Exactly how these costs would shift if Scotland had a differentiated deal is, for now, unclear: the Norway option is, according to the Institute, substantially less costly than a harder Brexit, but the costs of internal barriers between Scotland and rUK would then need to be factored in.

If Scotland stayed in the single market but was outside EU fisheries and agriculture policies (as Norway is) this could also impact on Scotland’s budget – especially if current EU financial support to agriculture was not fully replaced by the UK government. Scotland would also need to make a financial contribution to EU funding programmes.

UK and EU27 politics would be tough

Overall, while technically complex, Scotland staying in the single market could be feasible. Politically, it looks much more challenging.

At present, Theresa May is highly unlikely to negotiate a special deal for Scotland to remain part of the single market as part of a bespoke UK-EU deal with the EU27. May, as she made clear in her October Tory party conference speech, will not oversee a partial Brexit. Nor would she support something that might encourage foreign and domestic investors to shift to Scotland from elsewhere in the UK.

Even so, depending how the politics of triggering Article 50 develop, it is possible, if currently very unlikely, that the UK government would need to cut a deal with the Scottish government at some point to overcome a blockage in the House of Commons (or even at Holyrood – if the Supreme Court ruled that the Scottish Parliament had a say). Then some serious Scottish government-UK government bargaining could open up. However, if Westminster politics did change sufficiently for the UK government potentially to lose a vote, for instance on staying in the EU’s customs union, the SNP would have to think very hard about doing a bargain with the Tories and stopping an otherwise successful opposition vote.

From the EU27 point of view, Scotland wanting a differentiated deal would add to the complexity of already challenging, and potentially acerbic, negotiations. The EU27 have so far stuck to their commitment to have no formal negotiations until the UK triggers Article 50. Nor would the EU member states bypass the government of a state to talk to one part of that state in any formal talks. Whether the EU27 would seriously entertain the idea of Scotland staying in the single market if the UK requested it is, for now, an open question although there is certainly awareness that the Scottish Government is exploring this option.

All the EU member states are members of the European Economic Area too – but there would probably be considerable resistance to the idea of Scotland as a sub-state joining the EEA (which is, in any case, currently impossible according to the EEA Treaty). Spain would not be the only member state opposed to giving stronger rights or representation to a sub-state in the EEA.

Spanish Premier Mariano Rajoy

The Herald: Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy had previously insisted that his country's banking sector would not need a bailout (AP/Alberto Di Lolli)

However, if there were a way to include Scotland’s single market status in an overarching UK-EU27 deal, without needing Scotland to participate in EFTA or the EEA, the EU politics could be somewhat easier though the technical and legal side could then be more difficult without this ready-made framework. The EU27 would also want to be convinced that this would not open up a backdoor route for rUK into the single market. Even so, amidst the detailed complexities and politics of negotiating an overarching UK-EU deal, the added technical and political intricacies of including a separate deal for Scotland as part of the UK’s deal could prove too much for already burdensome talks.

With the Scottish cross-party consensus on this issue already fractured, even before the Scottish government presents its detailed proposals on how this might happen, the overarching question is why Nicola Sturgeon would continue to pursue this option rather than independence in the EU.

Scotland’s options in the face of Brexit

Where UK and EU politics may be by mid-2017 is currently unclear. As of late 2016, it looks likely that the UK government will continue to aim for triggering Article 50 talks with the EU27 by the end of March 2017. This could be delayed somewhat if the Supreme Court rules that a bill must first go to Parliament before Article 50 is triggered. Unless the Labour Party adopts a stronger opposition approach than its current one, the UK government is unlikely to lose in the Commons, although the House of Lords could prove more tricky. If the government was blocked it could well try to engineer an early general election.

Tough choices ahead

Scotland will soon face some tough choices. Assuming, as looks likely, Theresa May rejects any idea of Scotland staying in the EU’s single market, and triggers Brexit talks by March, then Nicola Sturgeon will have to decide her next move.

One option will be to call an independence referendum for 2018 (since a 2017 referendum would not be feasible, even if May agrees in principle to a second referendum, given the need for paving legislation and consultation). Such a move would require SNP rhetoric on the case for staying in the EU, and not just its single market, to be ratcheted back up substantially. It would also need, as the pro-independence side recognise, development and rethinking of the 2014 case for independence, not least on economic issues, including the question of currency.

Another option would be for the Scottish government to continue to bide its time as Brexit talks unfold. Nicola Sturgeon could continue to push for an influence over the Brexit negotiations, both through the existing, weak consultation channels, and through debate in the House of Commons (including the debate and votes over the Great Repeal bill).

Nicola Sturgeon with leaders from Ireland and Wales

The Herald: (left to right) First Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones, Taoiseach Enda Kenny TD, Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland Martin McGuinness, First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon and the Chief Minister of Jersey Senator Ian Gorst, during a press confe

Sturgeon may calculate that, despite tough bargaining ahead, the UK is likely to retain almost full access to the single market during the transition period. This could mean that if she chose to call a later independence referendum, perhaps around 2022 or 2023, that Scotland would not have diverged too far from the EU in the intervening four or five years.

Yet there are risks in such a strategy. The nature of any UK-EU transition deal is far from clear and the EU27 are likely to drive a hard bargain on any such deal. Moreover, it is unlikely to be agreed early on in the two-year talks, and at best it will only keep the UK in most of the single market (not in agriculture and fisheries and other policies). This deal would also require the UK to continue to apply all four freedoms and pay into the EU budget for the length of the transition period, which will be tricky for Theresa May to sell to the hard-line Brexiteers in her party.

Playing a long game could prove a risky option for the Scottish government in terms of Scottish politics too. The next UK general election is due in 2020, with Scottish Parliament elections in 2021. The SNP may use those elections as a springboard for a second independence referendum. Yet it could be that by the early 2020s support for independence has fallen back rather than grown, and that acceptance of Brexit may have also become somewhat normalised (if the economic downsides have been relatively contained until then – although recent economic forecasts suggest this is unlikely). The status quo at that point would be Scotland staying in the UK, outside the EU.

The SNP decision to focus on a single market compromise rather than to maintain focus and debate on the enormity of leaving the EU appears to play to a longer-term game on independence. This risks though being a self-fulfilling strategy, since if there is not a strong political lead on the importance of staying in the EU as a whole, Scotland will be enmeshed in a similar debate to the rest of the UK on how hard or soft a Brexit is in store. The only way to oppose Brexit fully is to argue to stay in the EU, not just its single market – for Scotland and for the UK as a whole. However, the Scottish government is limited in its ability to argue for the UK as a whole to stay in the EU, if UK political parties are not doing so.

The EU27 and an independent Scotland

How might the EU27 respond if Scotland did vote for independence in 2018 or later? The mood music towards Scotland, given its vote to remain in the EU, is certainly much more positive than the negative stance from Brussels and elsewhere during the 2014 independence referendum.

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If Scotland became independent and wanted to stay in (or rapidly re-join) the EU, that would be, in some ways, a considerable plus for the EU – showing that the European Union is still a force of attraction in a very challenging period. Even so, if Scotland followed a traditional accession process, then all member states would inevitably have a potential veto on its accession.

Whether Spain – or perhaps France under a more Gaullist president – might block Scotland’s accession is bound to remain a concern though the EU politics are much more promising than in 2014. Yet if Scotland held a constitutionally and legally watertight referendum there is likely to be enough difference between Scotland’s situation and that of Catalonia to give Spain flexibility in its choice, given that it does not anticipate leaving the EU like the UK.

The European Parliament would also have to give assent to accession. Its chief Brexit negotiator, Guy Verhofstadt, has been very positive about the ease with which he thinks an independent Scotland should be able to join the EU. The European Parliament, however, has no power to stop any member state vetoing accession, so its positive engagement cannot override political doubts if they arise in the member states.

Timing and transition for an independent Scotland

If Scotland said yes to independence as early as 2018, then the question would arise whether Scotland had to leave the EU with the UK or could stay in the EU. The timing would be very difficult. If Scotland held its referendum in early 2018, and the UK left the EU in early 2019, the UK-Scotland divorce talks are unlikely to be completed until the end of 2019 at the earliest, by when both would already be outside the EU.

EU27 leaders might be willing to solve this by giving Scotland some sort of unprecedented ‘special status’ so it retained its participation in all EU policies and programmes. This would be tricky to design since Scotland would at first, in 2019, be in the UK and outside the EU, then independent wanting to re-join the EU. One possibility might be for it to be given a special status within the EEA, although while Scotland is still part of the UK that could be difficult. It would, of course, need UK agreement, possibly at a very fractious moment in UK-EU27 talks – but the UK would only have a say for a relatively short period of time.

Some have argued that Scotland could be the successor state to the UK in the EU and so not have to leave at all. How this could be applied, at a moment when the UK would be in very tough talks with the EU over its exit liabilities as a member state, is unclear. Nor would the EU27 be likely to accept Scotland – as a new member state – keeping all the UK’s current opt-outs.

More likely is some sort of special status combined with fast-track accession talks. Since Scotland would already meet almost all EU rules and regulations, the main focus for talks would be only a few of the EU’s normal 35 chapters of accession negotiations. Scotland’s budget contribution would need to be agreed, and its full participation in EU justice and home affairs policies (but doubtless not in Schengen) would need to be negotiated.

Scotland would also have to face up to the likelihood of committing to eventual membership of the euro. Since it wouldn’t meet the criteria for joining the euro, and since Sweden has managed to avoid joining the euro while not having a formal opt-out, this might be difficult but manageable in terms of the Scottish debate.

Talks could take just a few months to complete but ratification of the Scotland-EU accession treaty would still take two to three years, meaning Scotland would be a full member state by around 2022. In the meantime, Scotland might be given observer status in the Council of Ministers and European Council (as the central and eastern European countries were before their accession in 2004).

In the scenario where Scotland did not hold a second referendum until 2022, and then voted ‘yes’ to independence, the politics could become both slower and more complicated. By 2022, the UK will have been out of the EU for three years, and Scotland will have had the chance to develop its own agriculture, fisheries and environmental policies (unless it deliberately matches EU policies). The EU27 will have moved on too.

Scotland might take until 2024 to finalise its departure from the UK. If Scottish legislation diverges from the EU over these years, then accession talks could take longer than in the previous scenario. If EU talks took 18 months to two years, followed by two to three years for ratification, then it could be 2029 before Scotland was back in the European Union.

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If, by the early 2020s, the EU27 had made substantial changes in the Union’s strategic direction – changes that it might not have made with the UK still a member – then its openness to new member states could alter. There might even be a decision not to continue with enlargement processes with any candidate country.

Scotland too might change. An independent Scotland in the early 2020s would have to decide if it wanted to be in the EU, follow Norway into the EEA, or stay out of both but perhaps with a special trade deal with rUK. What sort of country an independent Scotland would choose to be, and whether its current pro-EU stance would continue, is one more key question. If the SNP political focus remains more on the EU single market, and on soft versus hard Brexit, rather than on the positive case for the EU as a whole, then this question becomes increasingly relevant.

Conclusion – five scenarios

Many uncertainties and challenges lie ahead on the UK’s path to Brexit.

For now, the UK government is aiming for the UK to agree a bespoke agreement with the EU, a negotiation that will take several years, and where the UK is expected to ask for a transition deal to run after its 2019 exit.

With this UK approach to Brexit, the Scottish government’s declared aim of staying in the EU’s single market could be achieved either through independence and staying in the EU, or through having a differentiated deal allowing it to stay in the UK and in the EU’s single market. The latter looks possible but very complex technically. It also looks unlikely in terms of UK politics, and quite possibly in terms of EU27 politics too.

In the end, Scotland is most likely to have to choose between Brexit with the UK (outside the single market) or independence in the EU. At present, Scotland’s government is looking to postpone that choice and in the process lessening its pro-EU rhetoric. Yet, in the context of UK politics, where none of the main political parties’ leadership are making the case to stay in the EU and persuade the public again in a second UK EU referendum, the cautious SNP rhetoric is less surprising.

With Labour arguing for good access to the single market, and the LibDems, arguing to stay in the single market, and have a referendum on the final deal (with all its associated timing problems), UK parties are putting pragmatism ahead of leadership. In the process, the 48% who voted for Remain have little political representation, and the admittedly very slim chances of the UK reversing its Brexit decision look set to decline further, unless weakening economic performance impacts on voters even in the absence of political leadership.

If Labour, the SNP and some Tory rebels supported the LibDems call for a referendum on the deal, and the very real timing problems of that could be resolved so that such a referendum was conceivable in 2018, the UK politics could start to shift. Yet since very little may be known about the outline of the final UK-EU deal in 2018, this cautious approach to a second UK referendum for now looks unlikely to succeed. If the House of Commons did vote for a second referendum, it may anyway be more likely to trigger a general election than a second referendum.

In the Scottish political context, the fracturing of the brief pro-EU cross-party consensus that held at the end of June (with the exception of the Tories) is to be regretted. The Scottish Government’s focus on staying in the single market has, for now, a majority in the Scottish Parliament – but one that splits the parties on pro- or anti- independence lines. The fact that the LibDems support the UK staying in the single market but not Scotland doing so on its own (given that the UK government’s goal is a bespoke deal) attests to the primacy given to independence divisions.

Yet, despite Nicola Sturgeon’s caution, by 2017 a decision may have to be made – Brexit with the UK or independence in the EU. There are risks in either direction. If Scotland moves towards a second independence referendum in 2018 and if the Scottish public chose ‘yes’ to independence, the ball would then be in the EU’s court. The EU27 will have to decide whether to put out the welcome mat or not and will need to consider the best way for Scotland to stay in or re-join the EU. While the EU mood music on Scotland is fairly positive for now, if the Scottish Government puts a referendum off until the early 2020s, EU politics could by then look very different and the route into the EU could be more complex and slow. Decision time is approaching.

The choices the UK, EU27 and Scotland make could lead to one of five main scenarios:

Scenario One: Scotland part of a hard Brexit with the UK In this scenario, the UK leaves the EU in 2019 with a transitional deal allowing it some time (three or four years) to finish negotiating a comprehensive, bespoke UK-EU deal. This deal will not keep the UK in the EU’s single market or customs union. Scotland is a full part of the UK’s Brexit deal and remains within the UK as the UK-EU deal is negotiated over several years. Scotland either does not hold an independence referendum or votes to stay as part of the UK.

Scenario Two: Scotland might stay in the EU’s single market and the UK The UK government sets its goal as a hard Brexit deal whereby the UK leaves the EU’s customs union and the single market. SNP MPs support the UK government in a vote in the House of Commons in triggering Article 50 as part of a deal whereby the UK asks the EU27 to keep Scotland in the single market. The EU27 agree to discuss this but any agreement would only come with the final comprehensive UK-EU deal, which may take until 2023 or longer. In the meantime, the UK has a transitional deal for three or four years with the EU from 2019. Whether Scotland finally gets to stay in the single market remains unclear while UK-EU talks continue.

The first independence referendum

The Herald: A police officer stands in the Highland Hall at the Royal Highland Centre during the count for the Scottish Referendum

Scenario Three: Scotland says yes to independence in 2018 Scotland holds an independence referendum in 2018, before the UK leaves the EU in 2019. The vote is for independence. The EU27 agree to hold fast-track accession negotiations with Scotland as soon as it has formally split from the UK. In the meantime, the EU27 looks, with the UK, at how Scotland could have some form of unprecedented ‘special status’ so it does not unwind all its EU laws when the UK leaves the EU in 2019. Scotland eventually joins the EU as a full member state in 2022.

Scenario Four: Scotland holds an independence referendum in 2023 Scotland votes for independence in 2023. By then its laws (and those of the UK) have diverged somewhat from the EU, despite the transition deal (just coming to an end) that has given the UK substantial continuing access to the EU’s single market. The EU27 are less keen on enlargement and more worried about nationalist movements than they were in 2018. Scotland-EU talks start in 2025 but go slowly due to disagreements over euro membership and budget contributions. A deal is finally struck in 2027, with ratification taking three years. Scotland finally re-joins the EU in 2030.

Brexit

The Herald:

Scenario Five: Independence in the European Economic Area Scotland votes for independence in 2023. Its laws have diverged from those of the EU – both in agriculture and fisheries and at UK level, due to a faster-than-expected set of legal changes at Westminster and a shorter-than-expected transition deal. Scottish parties and the public are divided between re-joining the EU, joining Norway in the EEA, or staying outside both and remaining part of the UK’s trade deal with the EU even after independence. The EU is no longer in favour of enlargement and tells Scotland it will have to wait several years before its application would be considered. Scotland decides to join Norway in the EEA in 2025.

Recommendations

To the Scottish government: By early 2017, a choice is likely to be needed between Scotland being part of Brexit with the UK, or going for independence in the EU – unless political prospects for the intermediate ‘staying in the single market’ scenario change dramatically. Delay in choosing allows more time to observe how Brexit unfolds but reduces the chance that Scotland will smoothly re-join the EU at a later date.

To opposition parties in Scotland, and the UK: Options for Scotland to have a ‘softer’, more differentiated form of Brexit than rUK should not be viewed mainly through an independence lens but through the costs and benefits of differentiated options in their own right.

UK opposition parties need to start to make the case again for the EU, not simply for a soft Brexit.

If the choice for Scotland by 2017 clearly becomes being part of a hard Brexit or independence in the EU then opposition parties will need to make a choice between the two.

To the UK government: The UK government should be open to genuine consideration of differentiation options if it continues to pursue a hard Brexit.

To the EU27: Despite the prospect of very challenging negotiations, the EU27 should be prepared to consider the possibility of a differentiated approach for Scotland, if the UK government includes this in its negotiation brief.

If Scotland holds a second independence referendum in 2018, the EU27 will need to consider the best route for Scotland to stay in the EU whether through some form of transitional ‘special status’ and/or to re-join the EU through a fast-track accession process.