Comment: the case for our defence

On the face of it, these conclusions appear to be even-handed and reasonable: the Scottish Government does indeed have to be more forthright on how it sees an independent Scotland being defended (it is expected to be just that when it publishes its white paper on independence in November); the UK government must also push ahead with contingency planning for possible Scottish independence.

However, the HCDSC report draws disappointingly from an array of recent defence reports and defence commentaries which are largely pro-unionist in outlook and which appear less interested in offering bold innovative analysis than in opining negatively about Scottish independence. This approach is disappointingly evident in the HCDSC's report: it consistently emphasises the likely incapability of an independent Scotland while assuming a degree of credibility for the rest of the UK (rUK) which may be overstated.

Here are just some examples:

THE 'THREAT' TO BUSINESS

The HCDSC report asserts that after independence, Scottish companies dealing in "high-end technology" would face "a difficult future", a view which appears to suggest that only by being in the UK can Scotland's technologically-advanced industrial base thrive.

This is nonsense bordering on insult: not only is Scotland outperforming the UK in terms of exports - and will likely continue doing so over the next few years - but much of this export expansion is set to be in high-end fields where Scotland has a strong reputation, such as in the chemical and medical sciences, electronics, gaming, and in space and energy technologies. Our strong academic base will continue to ensure international-class performance; Scotland still has more top-100 universities than any other similarly-sized country.

THE 'THREAT' TO SHIPBUILDING

The oft-cited conflation between Scottish independence and an imploding Scottish shipbuilding industry is predictably reinvigorated by the HCDSC, despite the fact that the underlying narrative - that the UK government "looks after its own" in allocating lucrative shipbuilding contracts - doesn't really stand up to scrutiny. Shipyards across the UK (not just those in Scotland) have recently watched the Ministry of Defence (MoD) award a £452 million contract to South Korea's Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering to supply the Royal Navy with four new tankers, thus demonstrating the axiom that being in the UK is no guarantee of getting to build ships for the UK military.

The "Scottish shipbuilding implosion" thesis also appears to assume that an independent Scotland won't wish to build ships for its own navy, and that Scotland's capacity to win contracts by virtue of its excellent international shipbuilding reputation will somehow suddenly wane.

The HCDSC's suggestion - backed up by a quote from the UK Defence Secretary - that rUK would not seek to procure warships from shipyards in an independent Scotland should also raise eyebrows. This stance contains an element of fatuousness, since governments have a limited say in how private contractors allocate work for contracts they have won. So if BAE Systems wins a contract to produce a ship for an rUK government, it will be BAE Systems - and not Downing Street - which will decide where this ship is manufactured.

Aside from anything else, these comments demonstrate an uncomfortably prejudicial attitude which effectively asserts that rUK governments would be willing to ignore Scotland's tried-and-tested excellence in build quality and economic competitiveness simply because Scots had voted for a different political future.

THE 'THREAT' TO MILITARY RESOURCE

A similarly questionable attitude is evident in the HCDSC's consideration of possible Scottish-rUK defence collaboration. For example, the HCDSC urges the MoD in London to examine whether "the sharing of facilities, including operational bases and training areas … could work", before urging it "to identify any significant risks arising from this". While we would fully expect MoD planners to consider the implications of collaborating and training with the forces of an independent Scottish state, the suggestion that rUK might face particular problems - or even "significant risks" - in doing so is ludicrous. Would an independent Scotland really be seen as a distinctly "risky" partner when compared with all the other military partners UK forces routinely work alongside?

The Scottish Government's suggestion that it might make economic sense for an independent Scotland and rUK to co-operate on buying military assets is given similar treatment in the report. The HCDSC contends that while it makes "absolute sense" for "a small country with a limited budget" (ie Scotland) to "gain access to larger contracts offering better value for money", but then asserts that it is "less clear cut" whether such an arrangement would suit rUK. This possibility, it concludes, "would need to be examined carefully before a commitment was given". In other words, a judicious approach to defence procurement would be good for Scotland, but rUK would be wise to think carefully before agreeing to any such arrangement.

THE UK MILITARY 'BASKET CASE'

It is difficult not to see a patronising element to this stance; difficult also not to feel a sense of incredulity at such reticence when one considers the basket case which is UK military budget management. The MoD is currently sitting on more than £6 billion of military materiel which has either been over-ordered or simply cannot be used, including 54 years' worth of spare parts for an aircraft type - the Nimrod MR2 - which was mothballed in 2009.

In 2010, the programme to provide a new fleet of UK Nimrods was cancelled by Prime Minister David Cameron, after an investment of more than £4bn and just one year before the new fleet was due to enter service. Nimrod's extinction not only left the UK without an effective aerial maritime surveillance and reconnaissance capability, it also sounded the death knell for RAF Kinloss where the new Nimrod fleet was to be based.

WHAT SHOULD AN

INDEPENDENT SCOTLAND DO?

It is fair to assume that an independent Scotland would look to configure the Scottish Defence Force (SDF) having drawn stark lessons from the staggering profligacy of the UK model. It would look to spend wisely and - most importantly - it would look to develop a force structure more in keeping with what Scotland actually needs. It would not need aircraft carriers or nuclear-powered submarines; nor would it insist on buying bespoke equipment that it has specially designed itself - at great added expense - as the UK often does.

A case in point: both the US and the UK deploy Apache attack helicopters, but because of the specific design requirements requested by the MoD, the UK's Apaches have at times come in at more than twice the cost of US Apaches. An independent Scotland would look to procure the most suitable equipment for itself and would be wise to do so "off the shelf", just as numerous other state militaries do.

THE 'BUDGET SHORTFALL'

The HCDSC is apparently "unconvinced" that an independent Scotland will have sufficient monies to fund and support the proposed SDF and its provision. This is a puzzling standpoint, and one which smacks of politicking. A newly independent Scotland would develop its military capability backed by its 8.4% "population share" of UK defence assets, assets which are (conservatively) thought to total around £90bn. Scotland's share of those assets - in equipment or cash or a mixture of both - would allow it to make substantial progress towards establishing an SDF similar in scale perhaps to the highly-regarded Danish military.

Precisely what the SDF would look like and what it would do is an intriguing intellectual exercise but it is also something which will need to be given serious political and military consideration over the next year or so. The UK government could play a responsible part in this process by offering the Scottish Government a detailed and honest inventory of "UK military assets", thus allowing the Scottish Government to look at what is catalogued and to earmark what it might require from those assets.

This HCDSC report makes great mention of the need to give a "fuller picture" of what Scottish independence would mean for Scottish and rUK defence. But the writing of this report does little to meet this need and its exciting potential is blunted disappointingly by an overtly partisan view of the current constitutional set-up, and a willingness to depict an independent Scotland in the most dysfunctional terms. Quite how this report is supposed to add fruitfully to an intriguingly complex debate is unclear.

Director Dr John MacDonald is an associate lecturer at the University of Glasgow