THE decision of the appeal court in England to release Emma Humphreys

marks the latest stage in a debate that began in earnest in Scotland 16

years ago with the case of June Greig.

It now seems inevitable that the law will have to take a long, hard

look at how it treats women who retaliate after suffering years of abuse

at the hands of violent partners.

That raises a number of questions. Should the law treat women as a

special case? How do we define the concept of provocation? Should we

reconsider whether a conviction for murder should carry an automatic

life sentence? In May 1979, 30-year-old June Greig was jailed for six

years for killing her violent husband, at whose hands she had suffered

what was described as a life of hell.

The problem for Mrs Greig was that she inflicted the fatal blow as the

drunken lout was dozing in a chair.

She claimed she had been provoked, which would reduce her crime from

murder to culpable homicide.

The trial Judge, the late Lord Dunpark, instructed the jury in the

following terms: ''In the normal case of murder, provocation only

operates when the accused is either attacked or is so alarmed by the

violent conduct of the other person as to be reasonably apprehensive of

his or her immediate safety -- and I emphasise 'immediate'.''

Lord Dunpark reminded the jury of the evidence that the husband was a

drunkard and a bully, and had made his wife's life a misery -- a fate

suffered by thousands of wives.

''But if one day the worm turns, if I may use that phrase, not under

the immediate threat of violence, but by taking a solemn decision to end

her purgatory by killing her husband, is she not to be found guilty of

murder?''

The jury chose to disregard his clear guidance and convicted her of

culpable homicide, saving her from the automatic life sentence that

follows a murder conviction.

A decade later, Lord Dunpark had changed his mind. In an interview

with The Herald after his retirement, he said: ''If you take a broad

brush look at the whole background and consider whether there was

provocation in the lay, rather than the legal sense, that would include

the fact that the woman had been battered and abused for years and the

worm will turn eventually.

''I think that should be a ground for reducing murder to culpable

homicide.''

There is an argument that introducing a less strict, if commonsense,

definition of provocation will provide a licence to kill, but if juries

think the present law on provocation is inhumane they will not convict

of murder.

A more sensible option might be to scrap the mandatory life sentence

for murder and leave sentencing to the discretion of the judge, so as to

reflect the vastly different circumstances in which the crime is

committed.