Eight lessons learned from tragedy of Antares sinking

today make eight recommendations aimed at avoiding a repeat of the

tragedy which cost four fishermen's lives.

While the report confirms that the Navy was responsible for the

tragedy, it also says it is ''essential'' to ensure that all fishing

vessels are equipped with VHF radio equipment, and that crews maintain a

continuous listening watch in the interests of their own safety.

The findings of the independent inquiry by the DTI's Marine Accident

Investigation Branch largely mirror those already reached by both the

Navy's own internal inquiry, and the fatal accident inquiry at Paisley

which followed the sinking in November, 1990.

All three blame human error aboard HMS Trenchant, a hunter-killer

submarine which was being used to test a potential nuclear boat

commander when the accident occurred. The DTI describes this as ''a

partial breakdown in both the structure and standards of watchkeeping''

following the completion of a command course.

Most of the report's recommendations have already been implemented in

full or in part by the Navy, although three are still under discussion.

The recommendations are:

* Extending the notification scheme already in force in the Clyde to

warn fishermen of the areas and times of planned submarine activity to

all UK submarine exercise grounds;

* Policing exercise areas with naval surface vessels to ensure

adequate warning for fishing boats which have not heard or heeded

warnings;

* Compelling submarines not on exercise to travel on the surface in

known fishing grounds;

* Extending the minimum safety distance between submarines and other

vessels to 4000 yards, allowing for the safety of navigation of the

submarine and the extent of towed fishing gear;

* Impressing on submarine commanders the need to stick to reporting

facts and not inferences when incidents occur;

* That the Defence Ministry should carry out a thorough review of its

instructions for commanders to ensure that the lessons of the Antares

incident are known to all submariners;

* That submarine exercise areas should be reduced to the minimum

consistent with training needs;

* And that fishermen should be made aware of the consequences of not

maintaining a continuous VHF radio watch as recommended by the

Admiralty.

The Navy's main reservations are understood to be the need for

submarines, for operational reasons, to retain the right to exit their

bases submerged in certain circumstances, and the fact that

concentrating all submarine exercises in fewer areas might actually

increase the risk of collisions.

The report says HMS Trenchant was to blame for compiling an inaccurate

picture of the Antares's position and course in the Sound of Bute, and

is critical of ''inadequate'' attempts to contact other fishing vessels

in the area after the incident.

It also highlights the fact that the relay of ''inaccurate

information'' to the Faslane base operations room led to a delay of more

than eight hours in mounting a search and rescue operation and ''could

have contributed to the loss of life'', although there is no evidence

that any of the trawler's crew reached the surface alive.

It goes on to recommend that fishing vessels be compelled to stow

lifesaving equipment properly, and to ensure that it is maintained ''in

good order'' and ready for release in the event of a collision leading

to the sinking of the vessel.

The Defence Ministry has already earmarked #500,000 to provide

acoustic ''pingers'' to be fitted to fishing nets in the Clyde from next

year as part of an 18-month experiment to find ways of improving safety.

But neither the Navy nor the fishermen are convinced that the scheme

is practical or of any value. A concentration of trawlers equipped with

the devices would be likely to create ''a wall of noise'' which might

confuse sonar operators on a submerged submarine and make it impossible

to distinguish one contact from another.

The report welcomes the fact that the Navy has already undertaken a

review of its own command and control arrangements during submarine

courses, and therefore makes no recommendations on that issue.

Since the Antares incident, submarine exercises have been reduced by

about one-third at times when fishing is permitted, and all potential

nuclear submarine commanders must spend a day at sea in a fishing vessel

to improve their knowledge of the fishermen's problems.

A Clyde ''hotline'' has also been established to give fishermen a

direct link with submarine operations staff at Faslane, and there are

regular consultations between the Navy and trawlermen.

Advance warning of submerged submarine activity is already being

given, and now covers all of the exercise areas in the Clyde within the

UK 12-mile limit. A further expansion of the scheme is under discussion.