In the hall of mirrors that represents policy in Afghanistan it was difficult to make sense of the reflections accompanying the announcement that Mullah Mansour is now the head of the Taliban. Although he is known as a moderate who is allegedly keen on pursuing a peace process with the Afghan government, albeit with the support of neighbouring Pakistan, his deputies are two hardliners drawn from the ultra-violent Haqqani network - Maulavi Haibatullah Akhunzada, the Taliban’s former legal minister and Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network and the son of its founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani.

The formal announcement of the decision by the leadership council of the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s governing body, was posted on the Taliban website on Friday and it made an immediate impact in US, Afghan and Pakistani diplomatic circles in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad. Since its emergence in the 1990s the Taliban has been under the control of its founder Mullah Omar but in another surprising twist it emerged that he has probably been dead for at least two years and that in the interim Mansour has been in the driving seat.

So great was the influence wielded by Mullah Omar that the Taliban leadership clearly wanted to disguise his death in case it led to a schism within the movement. The fact that Mansour was entrusted with the fiction says much about his own leadership qualities and the support he enjoys within the Taliban. That much became clear when Mansour received the surprise backing of his longtime rival, battlefield commander Abdul Qayum Zakir, a former inmate of the US prison in Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay. In a letter published on the Taliban website, Zakir claimed that he had read reports “that I had differences with Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Let me assure that this isn’t true”.

It was always thought that Omar’s 26 year old son Yakub would form the succession but according to sources close to the Quetta Shura he was thought to be too young and too inexperienced. That could explain the decision to insert the two Haqqani network deputies to strengthen Mansour and to see off any possible rebellion but Yakub’s lingering presence could still create problems and threaten a split within the Taliban. Some of the reports from Quetta claim that Yakub walked out of the Shura in protest at its deliberations and took with him his uncle Abdul Manan, Omar’s younger brother but such is the secrecy surrounding Taliban meetings that any verification is never easy to obtain.

It is always possible that Yakub could become a focus for those members of the Taliban opposed to the peace process, especially the part played by Pakistan, and who want to continue the armed struggle against the Afghan government and its western supporters. There have already been reports that substantial numbers of younger Taliban fighters have left the movement to throw in their lot with the Middle East-based Islamic State (ISIL) which has already attracted renegade Taliban commanders based in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There have already been reports of friction between the two organisations with ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi mocking Mansour’s claims to be the real leader of the Islamic faithful, a claim that was repeated in the announcement from Quetta. Last week, in a more practical demonstration of those differences in approach, there was continued fighting between Afghan government forces and Taliban fighters in the south of the country as part of the seemingly never ending campaign to topple the regime led by President Ashraf Ghani.

What is known is that peace talks scheduled to take place on Friday were postponed at the last minute as a result of the surprise announcement from Quetta. These were supposed to follow the original tripartite talks which opened at the beginning of July and were brokered by Pakistan which had persuaded the Taliban leadership to come to the negotiating table at the request of its close ally China and Afghanistan. However, despite Friday’s postponement Afghan officials still hope that the talks can be resumed once Mansour takes over control of the Taliban.

There are also hopes that the potential fracture in the organisation could work to President Ghani’s advantage by allowing him to reclaim ownership of the talks from Pakistan. Although there are risks in pursuing a “divide and rule” policy especially when it is being pursued with the connivance of outsiders there is also optimism in Kabul that the emergence of Mansour could provide sufficient advantages for those moderates in the Taliban who have tired of warfare and want to pursue a peace process. They take comfort from the knowledge that the Taliban is not governed on tribal or ethnic lines but is based on Islamic principles which are embodied in edicts handed down by the ruling shuras. As Mansour has that support and as he has been in command of the Taliban for at least two years – if reports of Mullah Omar’s death are to be believed – there are sufficient hopes that the newly announced leader could be strong enough to take the peace process to its next and hopefully decisive stage.

This optimism also underpins US strategy in the region as a key part of President Barack Obama’s policy in Afghanistan is a cessation of the fighting and the emergence of an Afghan government capable to keeping the peace. When the news of Mansour’s appointment was announced it was matched by the White House with a statement which mixed optimism with caution, noting that a year had passed since the last elections and the administration was holding its own without the presence of US and Nato forces.

“Afghanistan remains a dangerous place, and the Afghan people still suffer from a brutal insurgency that continues to take innocent lives and hinder Afghanistan's prospects for peace,” said the spokesperson. “At this time of transition, the Taliban can choose to continue to fight their own people and destabilize their own country, or they can choose peace. We encourage the Taliban to heed President Ghani’s call for reconciliation and make genuine peace with the Afghan government.”