By Michael Keating

An independent Scotland would be out of the United Kingdom but still part of an interconnected European and global order. Indeed, small states in the modern world require overarching institutions to provide shelter from international economic turbulence and potential predators. Only a few superpowers can really go it on their own.

The United Kingdom, which is not a superpower, has left the shelter of the European Union and is seeking to establish a global role, untramelled by supranational constraints. A questionable proposition for a country of over 60 million, this would be out of the question for one of five million. Rather, for a small country like Scotland, or Ireland before it, joining international organisations, far from being a constraint on sovereignty, is the condition for exercising influence.

The main bodies which Scotland would aspire to join include the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). If it were not in the EU, it would have to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in its own right.

The first step to joining these bodies would be international recognition of Scottish independence and, generally, this would be triggered by recognition on the part of the United Kingdom. Under the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement, had YES won in 2014, this would have happened. This is one reason, apart from domestic legal considerations, why recognition of the process by the UK Government next time is so important.

Joining these bodies requires the agreement of existing members and there are few reasons in principle for them to refuse.

Contrary to some comment, Spain has never threatened to veto Scottish accession to the EU. Its position, as expressed by its Foreign Minister in 2014, is that it would follow the UK lead and that the situation was very different from that of Catalonia, where a referendum was unconstitutional and a unilateral process of secession was under way. NATO members, for their part, would not want to leave a gap in the alliance’s defences by excluding a strategically important place like Scotland.

The argument, rather, revolves around the conditions for accession to NATO and the EU and what role Scotland could play within them. Critics of the SNP have argued that NATO membership could be impossible, given the party’s stance on nuclear weapons. There is no obligation for NATO members to have or host nuclear weapons, but NATO’s strategic concept does describe it as a nuclear alliance, which could pose difficulties unless some ingenious wording could be found. Scotland, as a small power, would also need to think through the particular role it could play within the NATO defence strategy.

EU membership requires a state to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy; and the institutional capacity to take on the duties of membership. Scotland would have few problems there. There is also a Growth and Stability Pact designed to ensure ‘sound public finances’. If countries exceed its limits, they can be subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure, although no country has actually been fined.

EU Member States are expected to join the Euro, from which the UK had an opt out. In practice, no country has ever been forced to join the Euro against its will. On the contrary, it is getting into the Euro that is difficult, requiring countries to meet strict tests.

Sweden does not have an opt-out and meets the economic criteria for joining but stays out by not making the required institutional adjustments. Scotland might do the same although the EU might look askance at it sharing the currency of a non-member state (the Pound Sterling) given its commitment to banking union.

Scotland might, of course, decide to join the Euro as an alternative both to the burdens of having its own currency and to the Pound. This has been ruled out, presumably for political reasons. The Euro is widely associated with austerity policies following the Financial Crisis, although being outside the Euro did not prevent the imposition of drastic austerity measures by the UK Government.

Joining the EU is one thing. Another is what sort of Europe Scotland would want to be part of in the future. In the wake of the Financial Crisis, Covid and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has, contrary to some expectations, moved closer together, especially around financial regulation and markets.

It has started to issue its own debt, it procured Covid vaccines together and it is supplying arms to Ukraine. Brexit has, if anything, strengthened the tendency.

Yet populist, Eurosceptic forces remain strong in several countries. The commitment to freedom and the rule of law is tested in Poland and Hungary, while the EU has so far hesitated about sanctioning them.

The effects of austerity have again raised the question of whether Europe should have a stronger social dimension. As the EU strengthens its role in making rules, its democratic credentials are tested. Does its future lie in a federal union, or as a loose association of nation states?

The Scottish Government White Paper for the 2014 referendum envisaged Scotland joining the EU on very similar terms to the UK, including the opt-outs and the preference for an intergovernmental Europe.

Sitting on the sidelines might have been an option for a large member state, whether this was wise policy or not. For a small state, it is a recipe for marginalisation.

Only by fully embracing the European project and contributing to the building of Europe as a whole could an independent Scotland hope to gain influence. It would need the capacity to make policy and develop ideas, as the UK successfully did with the Single Market programme.

It would also have to learn the art of networking, alliance-building and compromise, something at which the UK was less adept. The SNP have made it clear that their preference is for full membership of the EU. They have been much less clear on what Europe they want to see.

Michael Keating is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Aberdeen