Israel/Palestine is one of those issues, like transgender matters, that a writer touches on nervously: the arguments are so deeply set on both sides that disagreements become accusations and debate moves into trenches. But here goes. The caretaker Israeli Government is poised to proceed with a construction project designed to obstruct a viable partitioned Arab entity. And the potential alternative government would also oppose two states. Is a single state now worth looking at, instead of the two-state solution that international polite society has demanded for generations?
Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and UN Resolution 242, still in force, which requires Israel’s withdrawal from both, the ‘two-state solution’ has been the international objective. It had earlier roots in the Peel Commission of 1937 and UN recommendations in 1947. For many years it was at least formally accepted by Israeli Governments too, though most Arab Governments and the Palestinian leadership continued to reject the notion of a Jewish Israel in the territory which had become Israel in 1948.
That is why the ‘Oslo Accord’ between Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation and Yitzhak Rabin’s Israeli Government in 1993 was so significant: the Palestinian Arabs accepted Israel’s right to exist within its 1948 boundaries, and a Palestinian Arab government, with less than sovereign powers for the five years of transition, was agreed for the West Bank and Gaza. The unravelling of this, with the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist in 1995, was one of the many tantalising missed opportunities which have led to today’s even more difficult impasse.
Meanwhile, support for the two-state solution has become a test of the respectability of Jewish and Arab leaders in the eyes of much of the world. Mr Netanyahu’s rejection of it was one of the ways in which he shocked much of the Western world; his possible successor, Mr Eisenkot, while seen as an improvement on Mr Netanyahu, is seen as a disappointment on this score. The harder-line right-wing Coalition ministers shock the wider world by saying that all Judea and Samaria should be annexed and incorporated by Israel, some adding that all Arabs should be expelled. And support for the parallel position of a growing number of Palestinian Arabs, that they should have a state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan, when expressed in the slogan ‘From the River to the Sea’, can lead in Britain to prosecution as a hate crime.
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The realistic prospect of a two-state solution has never looked so improbable, rejected now by a probable majority of Jews and maybe of Arabs in the area concerned. Is it time to look at what the alternatives might be?
Even if the UN Security Council no longer looks like a place where new models can be worked out, there is, I hope, still an international consensus rejecting large-scale deportations from historic Palestine, of Arabs, envisaged by some on the extremes of Israeli politics, and of Jews by some on the extremes of Arab politics. If there is wider agreement that the people living there should stay there, what single-state structure could accommodate them?
A likely one, popular in some Israeli quarters, is that it should be one in which Jewish Israelis, in today’s Israel and the West Bank, along with current Israeli Arab citizens, would be enfranchised. Others, including those in Gaza, would have non-citizen status and uncertain rights. The probability of this being an outcome rests on its being roughly the current situation. Extending it indefinitely is a model which the Israeli system knows how to work.
But this is not defensible, or even practicable, in the long term. A proclaimed national constitutional structure, with a large proportion of people permanently disfranchised and the franchise in some areas dependent on race or religion, may be a religious vision for some but does not fit in today’s world.
At the practical level, it would sustain grievances, not just in the West Bank and Gaza but in the wider Arab region. Israel’s (and Mr Trump’s) hope for an ‘Abraham Accord’, reconciling Saudi Arabia with Israel, would stay unreachable. And other Arab regimes, even where they may be sympathetic to Israel and the appeal of its technology, will face continuing hostility to such an Israel in popular opinion in their ‘street’. It is not a recipe for Israel’s future security.
A more attractive form of single state, though with very many pitfalls, would be one with equal rights for its citizens, Jewish and Arab, all fully enfranchised. The current population balance, across Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, appears to be near parity between Arabs and Jews, with a likely small Jewish majority. There would need to be many safeguards for both, indeed all, communities, probably including some kind of guaranteed power-sharing and certainly rigorous defences for minorities, whoever they are. On paper, a secular state on these lines would appear to be the answer, or at least something to be aimed at, if the option of partitioned states is set aside.
But…
Where would this leave the concept of a Jewish homeland, with guaranteed Jewish government of Jewish people and self-reliance? It might be consistent with the vague Balfour Declaration of 1917 in favour of the creation of a Jewish ‘homeland’ and its vague assurance that ‘nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’. But the view since then, strong among most Jews and with sympathy from much of the rest of the world, is that a lesson of the Holocaust is that Jews should have a place where they can be masters of their own fate. Could Jews accept a power-sharing structure that required consensus for security measures that Jews considered essential for their survival?
The potential for there to be an Arab Defence Minister informed of, and even maybe with a finger on the button of, Israel’s undeclared and uninspected nuclear weapons would shock many Jewish Israelis. The prospect even of a loose confidence-and-supply agreement, even with parties representing Arab Israelis, is too much at the moment for either contender for Government in Israel (though this may change under the weight of parliamentary arithmetic).
The ‘right of return’ is another likely obstacle, precious in equal and opposite ways for both communities. For most Jews, the idea that first Palestine, then Israel, could provide shelter for persecuted Jews is fundamental, as it is for Jews who are attracted to being in Israel for religious or cultural reasons. For most Palestinian Arabs, the idea of being able to return to towns or villages that their grandparents or parents, or they themselves, have fled from is seen as a basic element in a just settlement.
But in any democratic single state, a tense numbers game would focus on immigrants. ‘Returners’ would be voters, whether coming back from a generation or two in a refugee camp in Lebanon or Jordan, or from Brooklyn or Paris after 2,000 years of wandering and often persecution. It would be at least likely that Arab acceptance of a Jewish right of return in a single state would depend on acceptance of an Arab one. And it is very likely that this would be a sticking point for Jewish opinion.
For these and other reasons, a single-state solution in a democratic format looks unlikely. But it should be more, not less, discussed. Modern Israel strongly resents suggestions that it is an apartheid state, with some reason: Israel proper, with all its current strains and blemishes, is far from apartheid, as the emerging pivotal position of Arab parties in the Knesset is highlighting. However, rejecting a two-state solution without open examination of a one-state solution that includes equal democratic rights for all begins to imply that something closer to an apartheid state is envisaged in the West Bank and Gaza in the longer term.
The challenge, for both Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews, is to set out how a single state might work if two states are really off the table. It may revive the two-state solution as being more workable.
George Fergusson is a former British diplomat. He was the British High Commissioner to New Zealand and Samoa, and the Governor of the Pitcairn Islands, from 2006 to 2010. He was the Governor of Bermuda from 2012 to 2016
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